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Abstract
Previous research has established that the predictions of game theory are quite sensitive to
the assumptions made about the players’ beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness
problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model—the players’ beliefs
and higher-order beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters—for the behavior of a given
Harsanyi type to be approximated by the behavior of (a sequence of) perturbed types. This
amounts to providing belief-based characterizations of the strategic topologies of Dekel, Fu-
denberg, and Morris (2006). We apply our characterizations to a variety of questions con-
cerning robustness to perturbations of higher-order beliefs, including genericity of types that
are consistent with a common prior, and we investigate the connections between our notions
of robustness and the notion of common p-belief of Monderer and Samet (1989).
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1 Introduction
A major concern with non-cooperative game theory is its reliance on details. The formal de-
scription of a strategic situation as a game requires informational assumptions that are often not
verifiable in full detail by the analyst in real life, such as the players’ beliefs about the precise order
of moves, the actions available to the players when they move, and their exact payoff functions.
Unfortunately, game theoretic solutions are known to depend sensitively on those assumptions.
For example, in an exchange economy with uncertainty, where agents share a common prior on
the underlying state of the world, there is no feasible trade that is commonly known to be mu-
tually acceptable (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982), whereas such a trade can exist if the common
prior and common knowledge assumptions are slightly violated (Morris, 1994). In auction envi-
ronments, bidders with independent values retain information rents (Myerson, 1981), while the
auctioneer can fully extract their surplus when their values are slightly correlated (Crémer and
McLean, 1988).1 In the alternating-offers bargaining model of Rubinstein (1982), players reach
an immediate agreement in the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium, but delay to agreement is
possible in equilibrium when the players have heterogeneous beliefs about who will make an offer
in each period (Yildiz, 2003). In all these disparate and prominent economic scenarios, a model
that makes unwarranted informational assumptions may deliver predictions that are not robust.
What form of misspecification error can be allowed in a model of the players’ beliefs, to ensure
the model will deliver robust predictions across a wide range of economic situations? Focusing on
strategic-form games with incomplete information, we take the point of view of the analyst who
posits a type space (Harsanyi, 1967-68) to model the players’ uncertainty, and recognizes that
his model may be misspecified. For example, he may assume that there is common knowledge
of the true payoff-relevant parameter, but understands that such common knowledge assumption
can be at best an approximation of reality. Or, as is often the case in practice, he may posit
a finite type space, or a type space with a common prior, but realizes that the true type space
may be larger, or that the true common prior distribution may be slightly different from the one
assumed, or even that the players may have slightly different priors. To analyze the impact of
such kinds of misspecifications, we study the tail properties of the hierarchies of beliefs encoded
in the Harsanyi types—a player’s beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters, his beliefs about
the other players’ beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters, and so on, ad infinitum—and their
implications for behavior. Our main finding is an exact characterization of what it takes for a pair
of types to display similar strategic behaviors. Thus, we measure the minimum level of precision
of the analyst’s information model that is required for accurate predictions of strategic play.
To explain our results we first need to be precise about what we mean by “strategic behavior.”
Our behavioral assumption is that players play a Bayesian equilibrium on a type space (possibly
1Full surplus extraction has also been itself the subject of a debate concerning whether, and in what sense, it is a
robust result. See Heifetz and Neeman (2006) and Chen and Xiong (2013).
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without a common prior). Thus, from the perspective of the analyst, who does not know the true
type space of the players and has a concern for robustness, the relevant solution concept is (interim
correlated) rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2006). Indeed, the set of actions that
are rationalizable for a type t coincides with the set of actions that can be played in some Bayesian
equilibrium on some type space, by some type that has the same hierarchy of beliefs as t (Dekel,
Fudenberg, and Morris, 2007, Remark 2). A similar perspective is taken by Bergemann and Morris
(2009) in the context of robust mechanism design. See also Aumann (1987) and Brandenburger
and Dekel (1987) for early papers pioneering this approach.
Formally, our main results are characterizations of the strategic topology and the uniform
strategic topology of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006). The former is the coarsest topology
on the universal type space (Mertens and Zamir, 1985)—the space of all hierarchies of beliefs—
under which the correspondence that maps each type of a player into his set of rationalizable
actions displays the same kind of continuity properties that the best-reply, Nash equilibrium and
rationalizability correspondences exhibit in complete information games.2 Thus, for any player,
a sequence of types tn converges in the strategic topology to a type t if and only if, for every
finite game and every action a of the player in the game, the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) action a is rationalizable for type t ; (b) for every " > 0 and sufficiently large n, action a is "-
rationalizable for type tn, where " is a size of sub-optimization allowed in the incentive constraints.
Convergence in the uniform strategic topology adds the requirement that the rate of convergence
in (b) be uniform across all finite games (with uniformly bounded payoffs).
As shown by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), a sequence of types converges in the strate-
gic topology only if it converges in the product topology: for every integer k > 1, the sequence of
k-order beliefs must converge weakly. However, the Electronic Mail game of Rubinstein (1989)
and, more generally, the structure theorem of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), show that convergence
in the product topology does not imply strategic convergence. Our characterizations are based on
a strengthening of product convergence that requires k-order beliefs to converge at a rate that is
uniform in k.
We first explain the characterization of the uniform strategic topology, as it is simpler to state
and can serve as a benchmark for the other characterization result. For each k, endow the space
of k-order beliefs with the Prohorov distance, a standard distance that metrizes the topology of
weak convergence of probability measures (Billingsley, 1999). Say that a sequence of types tn
converges uniform-weakly to a type t if the k-order belief of tn converges to the k-order belief of
t and the rate of convergence is uniform in k. Our first main result, Theorem 1, states that uniform
strategic convergence is equivalent to uniform weak convergence.3 To interpret, suppose that the
analyst would like to make predictions with some minimal level of accuracy, and moreover he
2See the introduction of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) for a precise analogy.
3The partial result that uniform weak convergence implies uniform strategic convergence was proved in Chen, Di
Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010). The reverse implication is new to the present paper.
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wants to achieve this level of accuracy uniformly across all strategic situations that the players
might face. A necessary and sufficient condition for such uniformly robust prediction is that the
analyst’s model of the players’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs be sufficiently precise, with the
required degree of precision, as measured by the Prohorov distance, binding uniformly over all
levels of the belief hierarchy.
The content of Theorem 1 can be dissected in two parts. First, the theorem underscores the
role of uniform convergence of hierarchies of beliefs as a requirement for robustness. In light of
the structure theorem of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), which shows that the tails of the hierarchies
of beliefs can have a large impact on strategic behavior, the role of uniform convergence should
not come as a surprise. Second, the theorem quantifies the impact of a misspecification at each
order of the hierarchy by the Prohorov distance. We view this as a nontrivial part of the theorem.
Indeed, the Prohorov distance, on which the notion of uniform weak convergence is based, is but
one of many equivalent distances that metrize the topology of weak convergence of probability
measures. For any such distance, one can consider the associated uniform distance over infinite
hierarchies of beliefs. It turns out that these distances may generate different topologies over
infinite hierarchies, even though the induced topologies over k-order beliefs coincide for each
finite k.4 Theorem 1 identifies one of these uniform distances that ultimately characterizes the
uniform-strategic topology.
The characterization of the strategic topology (Theorem 2) is also based on uniform conver-
gence and the Prohorov metric, but is more subtle. The relevant class of events for uniform weak
convergence, and a fortiori, uniform strategic convergence, is the entire Borel  -algebra of the
universal type space. By contrast, our characterization of the strategic topology highlights the
role of coarser information structures called frames. A frame is a profile of finite partitions of the
universal type space—one partition for each player—that satisfies a measurability condition: each
player’s belief concerning the events in the frame must pin down a unique atom of that player’s
partition. (We discuss the meaning of this condition below.) For any frame P and any positive
integer k, we define a distance over types, dk
P
, that is analogous to the Prohorov distance over k-
order beliefs, but restricts the events for which the proximity is measured to those in the frame P .
Say that a sequence of types tn converges to a type t uniform-weakly on P if, for every positive
integer k, tn converges to t under dk
P
and the rate of convergence is uniform in k. Our second
main result, Theorem 2, states that a sequence of types converges strategically if and only if it
converges uniform-weakly on every frame.
A frame can be interpreted as a “self-contained” coarsening of the canonical information struc-
ture of the universal type space. Each event in the partition of player i must be measurable with
respect to the partition generated by identifying types that share the same beliefs about the param-
4In Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010) we report an example of a sequence of types that converges uniform
weakly but fails to converge in the uniform topology associated with a distance (different from Prohorov) that metrizes
the topology of weak convergence of probability measures.
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eter and the events in the partition of  i . In other words, each event in the partition of player i can
be interpreted as a statement regarding the belief of player i about the parameters and the events in
the partition of player  i , which can in turn be interpreted as statements about player  i ’s beliefs
about the parameters and the events in player i ’s partition, and so on. If the strategic behavior of
player i in a game is measurable with respect to player i ’s partition, it is intuitive that the strategic
behavior of player  i must in turn be measurable with respect to player  i ’s partition. This is the
fundamental intuition for why strategic convergence implies uniform weak convergence only on
frames and not on all information structures.
To shed further light on the impact of higher-order beliefs, we use our characterization to
investigate the connection between strategic convergence and a natural notion of uniform conver-
gence based on common p-beliefs (Monderer and Samet, 1989).5 Say that a sequence of types tn
converges in common beliefs to a type t if tn converges to t in the product topology and, for every
event E and every p > 0, the following conditions are equivalent: (i) E is common p-belief for
type t ; (ii) for every " > 0, k > 1 and sufficiently large n, type tn has common .p   "/-belief
on the event that the players have k-order beliefs that are "-close to those from E. This is the in-
terim analogue of the ex ante notion of convergence based on common p-beliefs that the seminal
papers of Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) have shown to characterize
the ex ante strategic topology for Bayesian equilibrium on countable common prior type spaces.
We establish, as a corollary of our Theorem 2, that strategic convergence implies convergence in
common beliefs (Corollary 1). However, somewhat surprisingly, we find that the converse fails.
These results highlight a fundamental difference between the common prior, equilibrium, ex ante
framework of the early literature and our non-common prior, non-equilibrium, interim framework.
Nonetheless, when the limit is a finite type—a type that belongs to a finite type space—we show
that convergence in common beliefs is equivalent to uniform weak convergence, and hence, a
fortiori, to both uniform strategic and strategic convergence (Theorem 3).
In the last part of the paper we use our characterizations to examine the robustness of the
most widely used models in applied game theory, namely those assuming types consistent with a
common prior. Lipman (2003) shows that such types are dense in the universal type space under
the product topology. We revisit, and reverse, this result in two ways. First, we show that the
set of non-common prior types contains a set that is open and dense under the strategic topology
(Theorem 4), that is, common prior types are nowhere dense under the strategic topology. Second,
turning to an ex ante perspective, we show that when the set of all type spaces is endowed with
the Hausdorff topology based on the product topology on types, there is an open and dense set of
non-common prior type spaces. Moreover, the analogous statement holds when the set of all type
spaces is endowed with the Hausdorff topology based on the strategic topology (Theorem 5).
To interpret these genericity results and illustrate their implications for economic modeling,
5An event E is common p-belief for a given type if that type assigns probability at least p to E, assigns probability
at least p to the event that E obtains and the other players assign probability at least p to E, and so forth, ad infinitum.
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consider an analyst who has imperfect knowledge of the players’ hierarchy of beliefs, and posits
a common prior type space. Given his limited knowledge, the analyst must deem it possible that
the players’ actual beliefs violate the common prior assumption, by the denseness of non-common
prior types. In this case, openness implies that, in some strategic contexts, every model that makes
sufficiently accurate predictions must be a non-common prior model. Thus, there exists no general
principle on which the analyst can rely, that guarantees that predictions made under the common
prior assumption will approximate the players’ actual behavior. While there are strategic contexts
where a common prior model does provide a good approximation, this needs to be assessed on a
case-by-case basis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the incomplete information
model and reviews the basic definitions and properties of type spaces, hierarchies of beliefs, com-
mon p-beliefs and the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability. Section 3 recalls the
definitions of the strategic topology and the uniform strategy topology of Dekel, Fudenberg, and
Morris (2006) and, after a review of the complete information benchmark, presents their charac-
terizations in terms of beliefs. Section 3 studies the relationship of our characterizations with the
notion of common p-belief of Monderer and Samet (1989). Section 4 examines the implications
of our characterization theorems on finite and common prior models. Section 5 concludes with
further discussion of the results and extensions.
2 Basic Setup
Given a measurable spaceX , we write.X/ for the space of probability measures onX , equipped
with the  -algebra generated by the sets of the form f 2 .X/ W .E/ > pg, where E  X
is a measurable set and p 2 .0; 1. Unless otherwise stated, product spaces are endowed with
the product  -algebra, subspaces with the relative  -algebra, and finite spaces with the discrete
 -algebra. With slight abuse of notation, we often denote one-point sets fxg simply by x, and
cylinders E  Y in product spaces X  Y by their bases E  X .
2.1 Games with Incomplete Information
In a game with incomplete information, payoffs depend on the profile of actions as well as on
an exogenous parameter that may not be common knowledge among the players. The Bayesian
approach to modeling games with incomplete information, due to Harsanyi (1967-68), requires
the specification of a type space to model this possible lack of common knowledge. Such spaces
describe the players’ uncertainty about the payoff-relevant parameter, but also their uncertainty
about each other’s uncertainty about the parameter, and any higher-order uncertainty.
We consider two-player games with incomplete information and denote the set of players by
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I D f1; 2g.6 The space ‚ of payoff-relevant parameters is assumed to be finite and to contain
at least two points. A game is a profile G D .Ai ; gi /i2I where Ai is a finite set of actions of
player i and gi W Ai  A i ‚! Œ M;M is his payoff function, where M > 0 is a uniform
bound on payoffs that is fixed throughout.7 A type space is a profile T D .Ti ; i /i2I where Ti
is a measurable space of types of player i and i W Ti ! .‚  T i / is a measurable function
that associates, with each type ti of player i , his belief i .ti / about the payoff-relevant parameters
and the types of player  i . The details of how type spaces encode higher-order uncertainty are
reviewed in section 2.3 below.
At this point, it is worthwhile digressing to discuss how the general formulation of type spaces
above relates to the one commonly used in applications. Readers who are familiar with our for-
mulation may skip the next two paragraphs without incurring any loss.
In most applications of games with incomplete information, uncertainty is modeled through
the standard interdependent values model: the space of payoff-relevant parameters is assumed
to have a product structure ‚ D Xi‚i ; there is a probability distribution f 2 .‚/ according
to which the profile  D .i /i2I is drawn; upon the realization of  each player i learns his
coordinate i and forms a belief over‚ i by updating the prior distribution f via Bayes’ formula.
This model can be translated into our formulation as follows: for each i 2 I , we have Ti D ‚i
and i W Ti ! .‚  T i / is given by
i .ti /.; t i / D
(
f .ti ; t i /
.P
 i2‚ i f .ti ;  i / if  D .t1; t2/
0 if  ¤ .t1; t2/:
The standard interdependent values model is flexible in some dimensions: it nests both the private
values model and the pure common values model as particular cases, and it allows types to be
either independent or correlated. Moreover, the model can be easily generalized to one in which
players have different prior distributions fi 2 .‚/, an extension that is desirable in some appli-
cations. Most of the mechanism design literature is built on the standard interdependent values
model.
However, the standard interdependent values model is restrictive for the purpose of our ro-
bustness exercise. It embodies a strong common knowledge assumption: the belief of a type
concerning the payoff relevant parameter only, called his first-order belief, completely pins down
his joint belief concerning the parameter and the type of the other player. As a consequence, the
second-order belief of a type, defined as his joint belief concerning the parameter and the first-
order belief of the other player, is completely pinned down by his first-order belief, and likewise
for all higher-order beliefs. In other words, all higher-order uncertainty is trivial in the standard
interdependent values model. But, as discussed in the introduction, in this paper we are interested
in quantifying the behavioral impact of perturbing the players’ types, so it makes sense to allow
6We focus on two-player games for ease of notation. All our results extend to the general N -player case.
7Following standard notation, for each player i we let  i designate the other player in I .
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perturbations to be as general as possible, rather than constrained by common knowledge assump-
tions. In other words, while in many cases it might make perfect sense to adopt the interdependent
values model for the unperturbed model, it is desirable to allow the perturbations to relax the com-
mon knowledge assumptions assumed in the unperturbed model, as the very nature of the exercise
is to quantify the degree with which strategic behavior is sensitive to such common knowledge
assumptions. For this reason, we adopt the general formulation of type spaces above.
2.2 Solution Concept
Our analysis is based on the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability due to Dekel,
Fudenberg, and Morris (2007), which is an extension of the complete information rationalizability
of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) to games with incomplete information. The definition fol-
lows a recursive process of elimination of non-best-replies in which the elimination is performed
on a type-by-type basis. An action is rationalizable for a type if it survives infinitely many rounds
of elimination of non-best-replies; at each round an action is declared a non-best-reply for a type,
if it is not a best-reply to any conjecture that is consistent with the type’s beliefs and assigns
probability one to each type of the other player choosing actions that have not been eliminated
thus far. The formal definition below allows for "-best replies, which leads to the concept of
"-rationalizability.
Let a game G D .Ai ; gi /i2I , a type space T D .Ti ; i /i2I and " > 0 be given. For ev-
ery i 2 I and ti 2 Ti define the set of 0-order "-rationalizable actions as R0i .ti ; G; T; "/ D
Ai . Proceeding recursively, for k > 1, define the set of k-order "-rationalizable actions of type
ti , written Rki .ti ; G; T; "/, as the set of actions ai 2 Ai for which there exists a conjecture
 2 .‚  T i  A i / satisfying the following three properties:
(a) Action ai is an "-best-reply to the conjecture: for every a0i 2 Ai ,X
.;a i /2‚A i

gi .; ai ; a i /   gi .; a0i ; a i /


 
  T i  a i

>  ":
(b) The conjecture assigns probability one to the event that each type of player  i plays an
action that is .k   1/-order "-rationalizable:

 
‚  ˚.t i ; a i / W a i 2 Rk 1 i .t i ; G; T; "/	 D 1:
(c) The conjecture is consistent with the belief of type ti : for every  2 ‚ and measurable
E i  T i ,
i .ti /. E i / D . E i  A i /:
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The set of "-rationalizable actions of type ti , written Ri .ti ; G; T; "/, is the set of actions that are
k-order "-rationalizable for every k:
Ri .ti ; G; T; "/ D
\
k>1
Rki .ti ; G; T; "/:
2.3 Beliefs
Type spaces contain implicit descriptions of each player’s beliefs about the payoff-relevant pa-
rameters, his beliefs about the other player’s beliefs about the payoff-relevant parameters, and so
on. Any such higher-order uncertainty can be modeled in a canonical type space, called universal
type space, whose construction, due to Mertens and Zamir (1985), we now review. An equivalent
formulation is found in Brandenburger and Dekel (1993).
A first-order belief of player i is a probability distribution over payoff-relevant parameters,
that is, an element of Ti;1 D .‚/. Recursively, for k > 2, a k-order belief of player i is a
joint probability distribution over payoff-relevant parameters and .k 1/-order beliefs of the other
player, that is, an element of Ti;k D .‚T i;k 1/. A hierarchy of beliefs of player i is an infinite
sequence in Ti;1  Ti;2     satisfying the condition that higher-order beliefs are compatible with
lower-order beliefs, that is, an element of the set
T i WD
n
.ti;1; ti;2; : : :/ 2
1
X
kD1
Ti;k W i;k.ti;kC1/ D ti;k 8k > 1
o
;
where i;k is the function that associates each .kC1/-order belief with its induced k-order belief.8
Given a type space .Ti ; i /i2I , the hierarchy of beliefs i .ti / D .i;1.ti /; i;2.ti /; : : : / induced
by a type ti 2 Ti is defined as follows. The first-order belief i;1.ti / is the marginal of i .ti / on
‚, that is, i;1.ti /./ D i .ti /.  T i / for every  2 ‚. For k > 2, recursively, the k-order
belief i;k.ti / is defined by letting
i;k.ti /
 
 E D i .ti /    1 i;k 1.E/
for every  2 ‚ and measurable E  T i;k 1. Thus, every type from an arbitrary type space is
naturally mapped to a hierarchy of beliefs.
Conversely, every hierarchy of beliefs can be viewed as a type: there exists a unique measur-
able function
i WT i ! .‚  T  i /
8The first-order belief i;1.ti;2/ induced by a second-order belief ti;2 is the marginal of ti;2 on ‚. Proceeding
recursively, the k-order belief induced by a .k C 1/-order belief ti;kC1 is the probability distribution i;k.ti;kC1/ on
‚T i;k 1 such that i;k.ti;kC1/. E/ D ti;kC1.  1 i;k 1.E// for every  2 ‚ and measurable E  T i;k 1.
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with the property that the probability measure i .ti;1; ti;2; : : :/ extends each of the measures
ti;1; ti;2; : : : Moreover, i is an isomorphism.9 The type space .T i ; i /i2I is called the uni-
versal type space.10 To ease notation, for each event E  ‚  T i we shall often write i .Ej ti /
instead of the more cumbersome i .ti /.E/.
Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) show that the set of "-rationalizable actions of any type
ti from an arbitrary type space T is pinned down by the hierarchy of beliefs of ti , that is,
Ri .ti ; G; T; "/ D Ri
 
i .ti /; G; T
; "

:
This fact has an important consequence for the framing of our robustness exercise. It implies that
we can, and henceforth will, identify types with their induced hierarchy of beliefs. We therefore
drop the reference to the type space from the notation for "-rationalizability, and write Ri .ti ; G; "/
for the set of "-rationalizable actions of type ti . To further ease notation, for " D 0 we denote
Ri .ti ; G; 0/ simply by Ri .ti ; G/, and call it the set of rationalizable actions of type ti .
2.4 Common Belief
The notion of common belief, due to Monderer and Samet (1989), is a useful tool to study the
robustness of strategic behavior in many settings (Monderer and Samet, 1996; Kajii and Morris,
1997, 1998; Ely and Pe˛ski, 2011). To define common belief in our context, we consider events
that are subsets of the space  D ‚  T 1  T 2 . Each point in  is a complete description of the
“state of the world,” in that it corresponds to a complete resolution of all the relevant uncertainty:
the payoff-relevant parameter and the type of each player.
For each measurable set E   and each type ti 2 T i , let Eti designate the section of E
over ti :
Eti D
˚
.; t i / W .; t1; t2/ 2 E
	
;
which is a measurable set by standard arguments. For each p 2 Œ0; 1, the event that player i
assigns probability at least p to E is
B
p
i .E/ D
˚
ti 2 T i W i .Eti j ti / > p
	
;
which is also a measurable set.11 Then, for each p D .p1; p2/ 2 Œ0; 12, define the event that E is
9That is, a measurable bijection with measurable inverse.
10The term universal is borrowed from category theory. It means that every abstract type space .Ti ; i /i2I is
mapped into the universal type space .T i ; i / by a unique belief-preserving morphism. In general, a belief-preserving
morphism between arbitrary type spaces .Ti ; i / and .T 0i ; 0i / is defined as a profile of measurable functions 'i WTi !
T 0i such that 0i .'.ti //. E/ D i .ti /.  ' 1 i .E// for every  2 ‚, measurable E  T 0 i and ti 2 Ti . The unique
belief-preserving morphism that maps an arbitrary type space .Ti ; i / into the universal type space .T i ; i / is the
profile of mappings i defined above.
11The measurability of Bpi .E/ follows from the measurability of the map ti 7! i .Eti j ti /. The class of events˚
E   W E is a measurable set such that ti 7! i .Eti j ti / is measurable
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mutual p-belief as
Bp.E/ D ‚  Bp11 .E/  Bp22 .E/;
and the event that E is common p-belief as
C p.E/ D Bp.E/ \ Bp E \ Bp.E/ \ Bp E \ Bp E \ Bp.E/ \    :
Then, define the event that E is common p-belief for player i , written C pi .E/, as the projection of
C p.E/ on T i , which is a measurable set because C p.E/ is a rectangle.12 Thus, we have
C
p
i .E/ D Bpii .E/ \ Bpii
 
E \ Bp i i .E/
 \ Bpii  E \ Bp i i  E \ Bpii .E/ \    :13
Note that for p i D 0 we have C pi .E/ D Bpii .E/, while for p D .1; 1/ the set C .1;1/i ./ WD
C
.1;1/
i .  T 1  T 2 / contains only one type of player i .
Finally, common belief has the following well known fixed-point characterization:
C p.E/ D Bp.E \ C p.E// and C pi .E/ D Bpii .E \ C p i .E//: (1)
3 Characterization of Robustness
To what kinds of misspecification of the players’ uncertainty are the predictions of rationalizability
robust? That is, given a player i and a type ti , what sequences of perturbed types tni converge to ti
in the sense that the strategic behaviors of tni approach those of ti? To formalize this question, we
use the notions of strategic convergence proposed by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), which
we now recall.
Definition 1 (Strategic topology). A sequence of types tni converges strategically to a type ti if
for every game G and every action ai of player i in G, the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) ai is rationalizable for ti in G;
(b) for every " > 0 there exists N such that for every n > N , ai is "-rationalizable for tni in G.
The strategic topology is the topology of strategic convergence on T i .14
can be readily verified to be a monotone class containing the algebra of finite disjoint unions of measurable rectan-
gles, which generates the product  -algebra on . It follows that the map ti 7! i .Eti j ti / is measurable for every
measurable E.
12The definition of Cp.E/ is analogous to the common repeated belief of Monderer and Samet (1996), which differs
from the original definition of Monderer and Samet (1989). A similar definition appears in Ely and Pe˛ski (2011) for the
case where E is a rectangle. We allow the event E to be any measurable set.
13Recall that for notational convenience we often denote cylinders by their bases. Thus, here we identify Bpii .E/
and Cpi .E/ with ‚  Bpii .E/  T  i and ‚  Cpi .E/  T  i , respectively.
14This definition follows Ely and Pe˛ski (2011). The original definition of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) is
stated a bit differently, but the two are equivalent, as shown in the working paper version of Ely and Pe˛ski (2011).
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The implication from (b) to (a) is a form of upper hemicontinuity of the rationalizable cor-
respondence: if for every " > 0 an action is "-rationalizable for every type in the tail of the
sequence, then the action is also rationalizable for the limit type. In particular, every action that is
rationalizable for every type in the tail of the sequence remains rationalizable for the limit type. In
non-technical terms, this means that the unperturbed model never fails to predict a behavior that
is predicted by the perturbed model. It is not a strong requirement: Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris
(2006, Theorems 1 and 2) show that the implication from (b) to (a) (holding for every game and
action) is equivalent to convergence in the product topology, that is, weak convergence of k-order
beliefs for every k > 1.15
Similarly, the implication from (a) to (b) is a form of lower hemicontinuity: if an action is
rationalizable for the limit type, then for every " > 0 the action is "-rationalizable for every type
in the tail of the sequence. To interpret, it is easier to examine an equivalent condition that does
not involve "-rationalizability: every action that is strictly rationalizable for the limit type remains
rationalizable for all types in the tail of the sequence.16 In other words, the unperturbed model
never makes predictions that are not valid for the perturbed model, unless those predictions rely
on non-strict incentives (i.e. indifferences).17 As the electronic mail game example of Rubinstein
(1989) demonstrates, this condition is not implied by convergence in the product topology. Finally,
if the implication from (a) to (b) holds for every action in every game, then the implication from
(b) to (a) also holds (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2006, Corollary 1).
The definition of strategic convergence allows the rate of convergence N to depend on the
game G. An alternative, stronger notion of convergence, similar to the one adopted in the early
literature on robustness (Monderer and Samet, 1989, 1996; Kajii and Morris, 1997, 1998), requires
the rate of convergence N to be independent of G (across all games with uniformly bounded
payoffs), which leads to the following definition.
Definition 2 (Uniform strategic topology). A sequence of types tni converges uniform-strate-
gically to a type ti if for every " > 0 there exists N such that for every game G and every
15The definition of the product topology is recursive: endow Ti;1 with the Euclidean topology, and for each k > 2,
endow Ti;k D .‚ T i;k 1/ with the topology of weak convergence of probability measures relative to the product
topology on ‚  T i;k 1. A sequence of types tni converges to ti in the product topology if for every k > 1, the
k-order belief of tni converges to the k-order belief of ti . Note that, since‚ is finite, the Borel  -algebra of the product
topology on T i coincides with the  -algebra assumed in the topology-free formulation of section 2.3. Likewise, the
Borel  -algebra on .‚  T  i / generated by the topology of weak convergence of probability measures (induced by
the product topology on T  i ) coincides with the  -algebra of our topology-free formulation. Finally, if we endow each
T i with the product topology and .‚  T  i / with the topology of weak convergence of probability measures, then
T i and .‚  T  i / are compact metrizable, and i is a homeomorphism (Mertens and Zamir, 1985).
16An action is strictly rationalizable if it is "-rationaliable for some negative ". In other words, all incentive constraints
hold with a slack that is bounded away from zero. The working paper version of Ely and Pe˛ski (2011) shows that the
two definitions are equivalent.
17Imposing the condition also for rationalizable actions that rely on indifferences is way too strong, as it would lead
to the discrete topology.
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action ai of player i in G, the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) ai is rationalizable for ti in G;
(b) for every " > 0 and n > N , ai is "-rationalizable for tni in G.
The uniform strategic topology is the topology of uniform strategic convergence on T i .
The main question we address in the paper is:
Under what conditions on primitives (i.e., beliefs and higher-order beliefs) does a sequence of
types tni converge strategically, or uniform strategically, to a type ti?
3.1 Complete Information Benchmark
Before turning to our general analysis, it is worth reviewing a particular case for which the ro-
bustness question above has a well-known, and simple, answer: the case of complete information,
where some payoff-relevant parameter is common knowledge for the unperturbed type ti . In this
case, we have the following well known result:18
Proposition 1 (Convergence to complete information). Let  2 ‚ and ti D C .1;1/i ./. For every
sequence of types tni , the following statements are equivalent:
(i) for every p 2 .0; 1/ there exists N such that for every n > N , tni 2 C .p;p/i ./;
(ii) tni converges uniform-strategically to ti ;
(iii) tni converges strategically to ti .
The two canonical examples below illustrate the application of condition (i) as a criterion for
strategic (and uniform strategic) approximation of common knowledge. In both examples, we
assume that ‚ D f0; 1g.
Example 1 (Public announcements with mistakes, Monderer and Samet, 1989). One situation in
which common knowledge of a payoff-relevant parameter arises is when there is an informed third
party (assumed to be non-strategic) who publicly announces the true value of the parameter before
a game is played. Moving slightly away from common knowledge, suppose that each player
(independently) hears an erroneous announcement with a small probability " > 0. Suppose also
that both players assign prior probability 1
2
to each parameter value. We thus have a type space
with two types, t"i;0 and t
"
i;1, for each player i . Type t
"
i;0 heard announcement “the parameter is
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Figure 1: Type space for Example 1
0,” while type t"i;1 heard announcement “the parameter is 1.” Their beliefs, derived from Bayes’
rule, are represented in the diagrams of Figure 1.
Thus, each type assigns probability p" D .1   "/2 to the event that both his own announce-
ment and the other player’s announcement are correct. As a result, for each player i we have
t"i;0 2 C .p";p"/i .0/ and t"i;1 2 C .p";p"/i .1/. By Proposition 1, as " ! 0, types t"i;0 and t"i;1
converge strategically to ti;0 D C .1;1/i .0/ and ti;1 D C .1;1/i .1/, respectively. This implies
that, irrespective of the payoff structure of the game, the predictions of the model under common
knowledge must be robust to the small amounts of incomplete information that arise in the public
announcements protocol when players are subject to a small probability of hearing mistakes. 
Example 2 (Faulty message exchange, Rubinstein, 1989). The players assign prior probability 1
2
to 1. Player 1 then learns the true value of the parameter. If and only if it is 1, the players engage
in an automated exchange. Player 1 sends a message to player 2. If the message arrives, player 2
automatically replies with a confirmation to player 1. If player 1 receives it, he automatically
replies with a new message, and so on and so forth. Each time a message or confirmation is sent,
it gets lost with probability q > 0, independently of all other events. The protocol gives rise to
a countably infinite set of types ft0i ; t1i ; t2i ; : : :g for each player i . Type t01 of player 1 knows the
parameter is 0 and, hence, no message was exchanged. Type t02 of player 2 received no messages
and is thus uncertain whether the parameter is 0 or 1, although he knows that in the first case no
message was ever sent, while in the second exactly one was. For each m > 1, type tm1 of player 1
knows the parameter is 1 and knows that exactlymmessages were sent, so he is uncertain whether
player 2 sent m   1 or m confirmations, while type tm2 of player 2 knows the parameter is 1 and
knows that exactlym confirmations were sent, so he is uncertain whether player 1 sentm ormC1
messages. The diagrams in Figure 2, where q0 D q=.1 C q/ and q00 D 1=.2   q/, illustrate the
beliefs of the various types, which are derived from Bayes’ rule.
18This equivalence is the interim analogue of the classic result of Monderer and Samet (1989), who characterize an
ex ante notion of strategic approximation of common knowledge. The result is a corollary of Theorem 3 below.
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Figure 2: Type space for Example 2
Asm!1, the sequence of types tmi converges to ti D C .1;1/.1/ in the product topology, since
for every m > 1 the .2m   2C i/-order beliefs of tmi exactly match those of ti . That is, the first
order belief of tmi assigns probability 1 to the event that the parameter is 1, the second-order belief
of tmi assigns probability 1 to the event that the parameter is 1 and player  i assigns probability
1 to 1, and so on, up to order .2m   2 C i/. However, tmi … C .p;p/i .1/ for every m > 0 and
p > maxf1  q0; 1  q00g.19 It follows, by Proposition 1, that tmi does not converge strategically to
ti D C .1;1/.1/. The conclusion is that, for some payoff structures, the predictions under common
knowledge of 1 are not robust to the perturbation given by the sequence tmi , despite the fact that
the perturbation preserves arbitrarily high orders of mutual knowledge of 1.20 
Finally, as we will see later, strategic and uniform-strategic convergence are no longer equiv-
alent when the unperturbed type ti is not a complete information type. In the remainder of this
section, we provide two generalizations of convergence criterion (i), which characterize strategic
and uniform-strategic convergence in the general case. We begin with uniform-strategic conver-
gence, as its characterization takes a simpler form.
3.2 Characterization of the Uniform Strategic Topology
Perturbations of the tails of belief hierarchies can have a large impact on strategic behavior. In the
complete information case, the characterization of Proposition 1 quantifies the impact of such per-
19Type t02 assigns probability 1 q0 < p to 1, while t11 assigns probability q00 > 1 p to t02 . Thus, t02 … C .p;p/2 .1/
and, by (1), t11 … C .p;p/1 .1/. Proceeding by induction, suppose that tm 12 … C .p;p/2 .1/ and tm1 … C .p;p/1 .1/ for
somem > 1. Then, since tm2 assigns probability q00 to tm1 and tmC11 assigns probability q00 to tm2 , again by (1) we have
tm2 … C .1 q;1 q/2 .1/ and tmC11 … C .1 q;1 q/1 .1/.
20The payoff structure for which the lack of robustness obtains is a version of the well known coordinated attack
problem.
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turbations by identifying a condition on the tails of the perturbed hierarchies—common p-belief,
for p converging to 1—that is just enough to ensure the robustness of rationalizable behavior. This
suggests that in order to characterize strategic (and uniform strategic) convergence in the general
case, the necessary condition that k-order beliefs converge for every k (convergence in the product
topology) should be strengthened by a requirement that the rate of convergence be uniform in k.
In order to define uniformity across the orders of the belief hierarchy, we first need to fix a
distance on the space of k-order beliefs that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of proba-
bility measures.21 The choice of distance matters: different distances, even if equivalent at every
order k, may yield different uniformities. The characterization of uniform-strategic convergence
that we provide is based on the Prohorov distance (see e.g. Billingsley, 1999, p. 72). The definition
is recursive: for each integer k > 1, define the distance dki on T i as the Prohorov distance over
k-order beliefs, assuming the space of .k   1/-order beliefs of player  i is metrized by dk 1 i .
Thus, for each player i , we set d0i  0 and, for each integer k > 0 and types ti and t 0i ,
dkC1i .ti ; t
0
i / D inf
n
ı > 0 W i .Ej ti / 6 i
 
Eı;k
ˇˇ
t 0i
C ı for every measurable E  ‚  T  io;
where
Eı;k D
n
.; t 0 i / 2 ‚  T  i W dk i .t i ; t 0 i / < ı for some t i with .; t i / 2 E
o
:22
That is, types ti and t 0i are at a distance at most ı at order k C 1 if for every event E concerning
the parameter and the type of player  i , the probability that ti assigns to E is at most ı above the
probability that t 0i assigns to a ı-neighborhood of E at order k.
The following notion of convergence of types, introduced in Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and
Xiong (2010), is the uniform counterpart of product convergence when the topology of weak
convergence of k-order beliefs is metrized by the Prohorov distance.
Definition 3 (Uniform weak convergence). A sequence of types tni converges uniform-weakly to
a type ti if
d UWi .ti ; t
n
i / WD sup
k>1
dki .ti ; t
n
i /! 0 as n!1:
Thus, under uniform-weak convergence, the tails of the belief hierarchies converge at the same
rate as the lower-order beliefs, where the rate of convergence is measured relative to the Prohorov
distance at each order. The examples below illustrate the definition.
Example 3 (Convex combinations with convergent weights). Consider a sequence of convex com-
binations of a fixed pair of types in which the weight on one of the types converges to one. That
21Recall that a necessary condition for strategic convergence is that k-order beliefs converge weakly.
22Viewed as a distance on T i , dki is only a pseudo-distance—as opposed to a standard distance—, since there exist
distinct types with the same k-order beliefs (and hence different `-order beliefs, for some ` > k).
16
is, given a pair of types ti , t 0i 2 T i , for each n > 1, let tni be the type whose belief is:
i .jtni / D

1   1
n

i .jti /C
1
n
i .jt 0i /:
Thus, for each n > 1, k > 1 and measurable E  ‚  T  i ,
i .E1=n;kjtni / > i .Ejtni / >

1   1
n

i .Ejti / > i .Ejti /   1=n;
and hence dki .ti ; t
n
i / 6 1=n. Therefore, tni ! ti uniform-weakly. 
Example 4 (Faulty message exchange with convergent hazard rates). Consider the type space
ft0i ; t1i ; t2i : : :g of Example 2 and, for each n > 1, let ft0;ni ; t1;ni ; t2;ni : : :g be the analogous type
space where the probability of a message getting lost is qn rather than q. We thus view each
tmi as a type in the unperturbed model, and t
m;n
i as a perturbation of type t
m
i . If the sequence
qn converges to q, then for each m > 0 the sequence tm;ni converges to tmi uniform-weakly as
n!1. To see this, let q0n D qn=.1C qn/, q00n D 1=.2  qn/ and ın D maxfjq0n   q0j; jq00n   q00jg.
Types t01 and t
0;n
1 are both certain that the parameter is 0. Types t
0
2 and t
0;n
2 assign probabilities
q0 and q0n, respectively, to 0. For each player i and m > 1, types t
m;n
i and t
m
i are both certain
the parameter is 1. Thus, for each player i and m > 0, the first-order distance between tm;ni and
tmi is at most ın, that is, for every ı > ın, type t
m;n
i is in the first-order ı-neighborhood ftmi gı;1
of type tmi . Proceeding inductively, let k > 1 and suppose that t
m;n
i 2 ftmi gı;k for each player i ,
m > 0 and ı > ın. This immediately implies that for each i , parameter  and indices `;m > 0,
i
 
  t` i
ˇˇ
tmi

> 0 ) i
 
  ˚t` i	ı;k ˇˇtm;ni  > 1   t`;n i ˇˇtmi    ı 8ı > ın:
Thus, the .kC 1/-order distance between tmi and tm;ni is at most ın. Since ın ! 0, it follows that
t
m;n
i ! tmi uniform-weakly for every player i and m > 0 
In Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010), we showed that uniform-weak convergence
implies uniform-strategic convergence. Here we prove the reverse implication, thus establishing
the equivalence between the two notions. The proof of the result is in appendix A.2.
Theorem 1 (Characterization of uniform strategic convergence). A sequence of types converges
uniform-strategically if and only if it converges uniform-weakly.
Ever since Rubinstein’s (1989) seminal paper, misspecifications of higher-order beliefs have
been recognized to have a potentially large impact on strategic predictions. The systematic treat-
ment of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) exposed the pervasiveness of this sensitivity by showing that
the phenomenon is not peculiar to the Electronic Mail game, and hence advocated wider scrutiny
of the assumptions one makes about the players’ subjective beliefs. Theorem 1 quantifies the
strategic impact of such assumptions (uniformly over games) by identifying an appropriate mea-
sure of proximity of hierarchies of beliefs. In effect, the role of the Prohorov distance in the
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definition of uniform weak convergence, and hence in the characterization result, is nontrivial.
Given any distance that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of probability measures, one
can always define an associated uniform distance over infinite hierarchies of beliefs. However, an
example in Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010, Section 5.2) shows that these distances
may generate different topologies over infinite hierarchies, even though the induced topologies
over k-order beliefs coincide for each finite k. Theorem 1 identifies one of these uniform dis-
tances that ultimately characterizes the uniform-strategic topology.
Theorem 1 serves as a benchmark for the characterization of the strategic topology in the next
section, which is also based on uniform convergence in the orders of the hierarchy of beliefs.
Uniform weak convergence requires convergence of beliefs concerning all events in the universal
type space. Relaxing this requirement is the key to our characterization of the strategic topology
below.
3.3 Characterization of the Strategic Topology
The definition of uniform weak convergence embodies two kinds of uniformity. The first kind,
emphasized in the previous section, requires the rate of convergence of k-order beliefs to be uni-
form in k. The second kind, which applies to any fixed order k, is the uniformity in events that is
implicit in the definition of the Prohorov distance: the k-order distance between types ti and t 0i is
less than ı if and only if
sup
E

i .Ejti /   i .Eı;k 1jt 0i /

6 ı;
where the supremum ranges over all measurable subsets E  ‚  T  i . Such uniformity in
events is unnecessarily strong if the goal is to characterize the strategic topology, which does not
require the rate of strategic convergence to be uniform in games. Indeed, given a fixed game, not
all events concerning player  i are strategically relevant for player i .23 The main result of this
section, Theorem 2, characterizes the strategic topology in terms of a notion of convergence of
types that maintains the uniformity in the orders of the belief hierarchy, but only considers events
from certain coarse information structures, which we now define.
Definition 4 (Frames). A frame is a profile P D .Pi /i2I , where each Pi is a finite measurable
partition of T i such that for each ti ; t 0i 2 T i ,
i . Ej ti / D i . Ej t 0i / 8 2 ‚; 8E 2 P i H) t 0i 2 Pi .ti /:
23For instance, consider a game where an action ai is rationalizable for a type ti if and only if he attaches probability
greater than a threshold to player  i playing a certain action a i . Then, in order for type ti to verify whether he can
rationalize ai , he only needs to check whether his belief about the event that a i is rationalizable for player  i lies
above or below the threshold. In particular, the probability that type ti assigns to any measurable proper subset of the
latter event does not matter.
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Thus, a partition profile is a frame if any two types of player i that agree on their beliefs
concerning the parameter and the events in the partition of player  i must belong to the same
element of i ’s partition. Equivalently, each event in the partition of player i must be measurable
with respect to the partition generated by identifying types that share the same beliefs about the
parameter and the events in the partition of player  i . A frame is thus a coarse information model
that is “self-contained:” each event in the partition of player i can be interpreted as a statement
regarding the belief of player i about the parameters and the events in the partition of player  i ,
which can in turn be interpreted as statements about player  i ’s beliefs about the parameters and
the events in player i ’s partition, and so on.
As the notion of frames will play a central role in our characterization, it is helpful to go over
a few examples to illustrate the definition.
Example 5 (Finite-order frames). A k-order frame is a frame whose elements are k-order measur-
able events, that is, any two types with the same k-order beliefs must belong to the same partition
element. Note that any profile of first-order measurable partitions is a (first-order) frame, as it
can be readily verified from Definition 4. Examples of higher order frames can be constructed
recursively, beginning with an arbitrary first-order frame. For instance, fix  2 ‚ and, for each
player i , fix a Borel measurable subset Bi  Œ0; 1. Then, partition T i according to whether the
probability that i assigns to  lies in Bi . That is, consider the first-order frame Pi D fFi ; T i nFig,
where
Fi D
˚
ti W i . jti / 2 Bi
	
:
Next, fix a Borel measurable subset B 0i  Œ0; 1 for each player i and consider the partition P 0i D
fF 0i ; T i nF 0i g, where F 0i is the event that player i assigns a probability in B 0i to the event that the
parameter is  and player  i assigns to  a probability in B i . That is,
F 0i D
˚
ti W i
 
  F i
ˇˇ
ti
 2 B 0i	:
Then, the join of the partitionsPi andP 0i , which we denote byP 00i , partitions T i into four second-
order measurable events, according to whether a type belongs to each of the events Fi and F 0i .24
The profile P 00 D .P 00i /i2I is an example of a second-order frame. Examples of higher order
frames can be constructed in a similar fashion. 
Example 6 (Common belief frames). Partitioning types according to whether or not a given subset
of parameters is common belief gives rise to a frame. Formally, for each E  ‚ and p 2 Œ0; 12,
the profile of bi-partitions Pi D
˚
C
p
i .E/; T

i n C pi .E/
	
, i 2 I , is a frame. Indeed, if any two
types of player i agree on the probabilities assigned to the elements of ‚  P i , then they must
agree on the probability of the event EC p i .E/. Thus, by property (1) of common beliefs, either
both types belong to C pi .E/, or neither does. More generally, given a frame P D .Pi /i2I , a
24Recall that the join of a pair of partitions Pi and P 0i , written Pi _P 0i is the coarsest partition that is finer than both
Pi and P 0i .
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collection of events E1; : : : ; Em 2 2‚ ˝ P1 ˝ P2 and a collection of pairs p1; : : : ;pm 2 Œ0; 12,
the profile of joined partitions
Pi _
˚
C
p1
i .E1/; T

i n C p1i .E1/
	 _    _ ˚C pmi .Em/; T i n C pmi .Em/	; i 2 I;
is a frame, called a common belief frame. 
Example 7 (Strategic frames). Given a game G D .Ai ; gi /i2I , the strategic frame associated
withG is the profile of partitionsP D .Pi /i2I where the elements of eachPi are the equivalence
classes of types with the same rationalizable actions in G, that is,
Pi D
n˚
ti W Ri .ti ; G/ D A0i
	 W ¿ ¤ A0i  Aio:
The proof that P is indeed a frame, given in Appendix A.3, is based on the observation that an
action is rationalizable for a type of player i only if it can be rationalized (at each order) by a
conjecture  2 .‚  T  i  A i / that assumes that all types of player  i that share the same
rationalizable actions behave in the same way. That is, for each A0 i  A i and a i 2 A0 i ,
the ratio .  E i  a i /=.  E i  A0 i / is the same for each parameter  and each event
E i 
˚
t i W R i .t i ; G/ D A0 i
	
. This observation implies that, in order for a type of player
i to rationalize an action in G, what matters is the probability assigned to events of the form
  ft i W R i .t i ; G/ D A0 i
	
, not how this probability is distributed within those events. As
a result, all types of player i who agree on the probabilities assigned to the elements of ‚  P i
must have the same rationalizable actions and thus belong to the same element of Pi . 
We now define the notion of convergence that is used in the characterization of the strategic
topology below. Given a frame P D .Pi /i2I , for each player i set d0i;P  0 and, recursively, for
each integer k > 0 and types ti and t 0i , define
dkC1
i;P
.ti ; t
0
i / D inf
n
ı > 0 W i .Ej ti / 6 i
 
E
ı;k
P
ˇˇ
t 0i
C ı 8E 2 2‚ ˝P io; 25
where Eı;k
P
denotes the ı-neighborhood of event E at order k relative to P , that is,
E
ı;k
P
D
n
.; t 0 i / 2 ‚  T  i W dk i;P .t i ; t 0 i / < ı for some t i with .; t i / 2 E
o
:
Thus, the definition of dk
i;P
is similar to that of the k-order Prohorov distance dki , but restricts the
events for which the proximity is measured to those in the frame P .26
Definition 5 (Uniform weak convergence relative to a frame). Let P D .Pi /i2I be a frame. A
sequence of types tni converges to a type ti uniform-weakly on P if
d UWi;P .ti ; t
n
i / WD sup
k>1
dki;P .ti ; t
n
i /! 0 as n!1:
25Here, 2‚˝P i denotes the algebra of events in‚T  i generated by the sets of the form F i , withF i 2 P i .
26This restriction makes dk
i;P
only a pre-distance, that is, it satisfies dk
i;P
.ti ; t
0
i / > 0 and d
k
i;P
.ti ; ti / D 0, but it may
fail symmetry and the triangle inequality.
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With this definition in place, we are ready to state our main result, whose proof is presented in
Appendix A.4.
Theorem 2 (Characterization of strategic convergence). A sequence of types converges strategi-
cally if and only if it converges uniform-weakly on every frame.
The theorem has both conceptual and practical implications. First, it deepens our understand-
ing of the foundations of strategic robustness (or lack thereof) by qualifying the impact that the
tails of the belief hierarchies have on the strategic behaviors of a type. As in Theorem 1, the result
draws attention to a particular form of uniform convergence across the levels of the belief hier-
archy as a condition for robustness. While it is expected that some form of uniform convergence
should play a role, it is much less clear at the outset what kind of uniformity would ultimately
lead to a characterization. The theorem highlights the role of frames as the coarse information
structures that are relevant for strategic convergence.
Second, the characterization provides a practical criterion for robustness, similar to the role
of common p-beliefs in the complete information case. From the applied perspective, the if di-
rection of the theorem is more useful. Indeed, it is often the case that the analyst is interested in
a particular game, or a small parametrized family of games. If the perturbations that the analyst
contemplates pass the robustness criterion provided by the theorem, then the analyst is reassured
that the predictions of the unperturbed model are robust in the game(s) of interest. However, if the
perturbation fails the criterion, then the theorem only implies that there is some payoff structure
for which the predictions of the unperturbed model fail to be robust. Failure of the criterion thus
“raises a flag" to the analyst, but is ultimately inconclusive: further examination is required to
determine whether the predictions of interest are robust. Nonetheless, the only if direction of the
result is still useful, as it ensures the criterion is sharp: among all sufficient conditions for robust-
ness that do not make use of the payoff structure, the criterion of Theorem 2 is one that minimizes
the instances when the “flag is raised” unnecessarily.
The applied perspective put forward above leads naturally to a question: How easy is it to
verify that a sequence of perturbations passes the robustness criterion of Theorem 2? This is ulti-
mately a complexity question and it is hard to give a precise answer. Instead, we provide an ex-
ample below to illustrate a relatively simple application of the criterion in a nontrivial case where
the stronger (but easier-to-check) condition of uniform weak convergence fails. The economics of
the example is interesting in its own right: the unperturbed type space is the one generated by the
automated message exchange protocol of Rubinstein (1989), while the perturbed type space is gen-
erated by a variation of the same protocol in which the players, whom we interpret as boundedly
rational, become “overwhelmed by evidence” once the number of messages exchanged reaches
an arbitrarily large (but finite) threshold, in which case they believe the parameter is common
knowledge.
Example 8 (Faulty message exchange with “boundedly rational” players). Suppose the unper-
turbed model is the message exchange type space ft0i ; t1i ; t2i ; : : :g of Example 2. Recall that in
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that type space there is no type that has common knowledge of 1, regardless of the number of
messages exchanged. The perturbed model is a variation of this type space in which the players
mistakenly believe there is common knowledge of 1 as soon as they have received n messages,
where n > 1 is interpreted as the level of sophistication of the players.27 Formally, for each n > 1
we consider a finite type space fs0;ni ; s1;ni ; : : : ; sn;ni g where sn;ni has common knowledge of 1,
and the beliefs of the remaining types mimic those of the type space in Example 2, as illustrated
in Figure 3. For each player i and m > 0, does the sequence sm;ni converge strategically to tmi as
n!1?
s
0;n
1
-
1
0  s0;n2 s0;n2 

:q
0 0  s0;n1
XXXXXXXXz1   q0 1  s1;11
s
m;n
1


:q00 1  sm 1;n2
XXXXXXXXz1   q00 1  sm;n2
s
m;n
2


:q00 1  sm;n1
XXXXXXXXz1   q00 1  smC1;n1
s
n;n
1
-
1
1  sn;n2 sn;n2 -
1
1  sn;n1
Figure 3: Type space for Example 8
The sequence sm;ni fails the uniform weak converge criterion. Indeed, it can be readily verified
that the .2n   1C i/-order Prohorov distance between sn;ni and tni must exceed minfq0; q00g and
hence, by an induction argument, for each 0 6 m 6 n  1 the .4n  2m  i C 1/-order Prohorov
distance between sm;ni and t
m
i is also at least minfq0; q00g.
Nonetheless, we show that the sequence converges strategically by verifying the criterion of
Theorem 2: the sequence sm;ni converges to t
m
i uniform-weakly on every frame. In effect, for
every frame P D .Pi /i2I we show that d UWi;P .sm;ni ; tmi / D 0 for every n sufficiently large. To see
why, first note that, since each Pi is finite, there exists N large enough that, for each n > N   1
and player i , the intersection Pi .tni / \ ft0i ; t1i ; t2i ; : : :g is infinite.28 This implies that for every
27Here the words “mistakenly” and “sophistication” should be interpreted with care. To present the perturbed model
we have used a bounded rationality story: unlike in the unperturbed model, the players are not able to apply Bayes’ rule
exactly; once the number of messages exchanged exceeds a finite threshold, they believe there is common knowledge
of 1, rather than just mutual knowledge up to a finite order. However, bounded rationality is only a story here, as the
perturbed model is still a standard type space.
28Following standard notation, Pi .ti / designates the element of Pi containing ti .
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i 2 I , n > N , k > 1 and ı > 0, type sn;n i D C .1;1/ i .1/ belongs to the k-order Prohorov ı-
neighborhood of each of the frame elements
P i .tn 1 i /; P i .tn i / and P i .tnC1 i /;
as each of these sets, having an infinite intersection with ft0 i ; t1 i ; t2 i ; : : :g, must contain some
type tm i that has the same k-order beliefs as s
n;n
 i .29 As the support of i .jtni / is contained in
1  ftn 1 i ; tn i ; tnC1 i g, it follows that
i .E
ı;k
P
jsn;ni / > i .Eı;kjsn;ni / > i .Ejtni /   ı 8E 2 2‚ ˝P1 ˝P2;
and since ı > 0 is arbitrary, we have dk
i;P
.tni ; s
n;n
i / D 0 for every k > 1 and n > N . Next, since
the beliefs of s0;ni ; : : : ; s
n 1;n
i mimic those of t
0
i ; : : : ; t
n 1
i (compare Figures 2 and 3), for every
0 6 m 6 n   1 we have d1
i;P
.tmi ; s
m;n
i / D 0, and for every k > 1,
dkC2
i;P
.t0i ; s
0;n
i / 6 max
n
dki;P .t
1
i ; s
1;n
i /; d
k
i;P .t
0
i ; s
0;n
i /
o
;
and for every 1 6 m 6 n   1,
dkC2
i;P
.tmi ; s
m;n
i / 6 max
n
dki;P .t
mC1
i ; s
mC1;n
i /; d
k
i;P .t
m
i ; s
m;n
i /; d
k
i;P .t
m 1
i ; s
m 1;n
i /
o
:
These conditions, combined with the fact that dk
i;P
.tni ; s
n;n
i / D 0 for every k > 1 and n > N
(demonstrated above), imply that dk
i;P
.tmi ; s
m;n
i / D 0 for every k > 1, n > N and 0 6 m 6 n.
Therefore, d UW
i;P
.tmi ; s
m;n
i / D 0 for every n > N and 0 6 m 6 n. Since the frame P is arbitrary,
we conclude that tm;ni converges to t
m
i uniform-weakly on every frame. 
It is worthwhile remarking that the proof of the theorem, in Appendix A.4, actually demon-
strates a stronger, context-dependent version of the if direction:
Given a game G and " > 0, any action that is rationalizable for a type ti in G must remain ratio-
nalizable for any type sufficiently far in the tail of any given sequence converging to ti uniform-
weakly on the strategic frame of G.
To the extent that uniform weak convergence on a given frame (strategic or otherwise) is a less
demanding condition than uniform weak convergence on all frames, such a context-dependent
criterion for robustness is potentially useful. Whether it will actually be useful in practice will
depend on the possibility of exploiting properties of the particular payoff functions of interest
(beyond finiteness of action sets) to obtain a tractable sufficient condition for uniform weak con-
vergence on the corresponding strategic frame (weaker than uniform weak convergence on all
frames). We return to this issue in section 5, where we discuss the possibility of characterizions
of strategic convergence for classes of games (as opposed to all games).
29Recall from Example 2 that sn;ni and t
m
i are at zero .2m   2C i/-order Prohorov distance.
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However, the context-dependent version of the only if direction fails to hold: convergence
of rationalizable behavior in a given game G does not imply uniform weak convergence on the
strategic frame of G. To see why, pick any game G in which the payoff of each player depends
on his own action and on the parameter only, so that the strategic frame of G is a nontrivial first-
order frame. Then, any sequence of types whose first order beliefs converge must also converge
strategically in game G. But this clearly does not imply that the sequence will converge uniform
weakly on the strategic frame of G, as it does not even imply convergence at second order.
A related comment is that uniform weak convergence on all strategic frames is equivalent to
strategic convergence. This follows directly from the stronger version of the if direction discussed
above, and the only if direction of Theorem 2. However, we find such a characterization less
interesting than the one stated in the theorem, as we do not have a characterization of strategic
frames that does not make explicit reference to the rationalizable correspondence, hence we regard
strategic frames as “endogenous” objects. By contrast, general frames are defined in terms of a
purely epistemic condition. In fact, not every frame is a strategic frame. In a strategic frame,
each player’s partition must contain an element that is open in the product topology, namely, any
element consisting of types whose set of rationalizable actions is minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion).30
General frames, however, need not have elements that are open sets. Letting Bi be the set of
rational numbers in the first-order frame of Example 5 illustrates this fact.
Finally, Theorem 2 enables a connection with the early literature on robustness and, in partic-
ular, with the notion of common p-beliefs. This connection is the subject of the next section.
3.4 Connection to Common Beliefs
Previous work on robustness of Bayesian equilibrium in common prior settings (Monderer and
Samet, 1989, 1996; Kajii and Morris, 1998) has proved equivalences between ex ante notions of
strategic convergence and convergence of common beliefs. In this section, we reexamine this
connection in our interim, non-common prior framework.
Definition 6 (Common belief convergence). A sequence of types tni converges in common beliefs
to a type ti if for every ı > 0 and k > 1 there existsN > 1 such that for every n > N , p 2 Œ0; 12
and measurable E  ,
ti 2 C pi .E/ H) tni 2 C p .ı;ı/i
 
Eı;k

:31
Thus convergence in common beliefs requires each event that is common p-belief for the limit
30That such an element is product-open follows from minimality and the upper hemi-coninuity of the rationalizable
correspondence in the product topology.
31If we modify the definition by restricting the class of events E to be the class of sets that are closed in the product
topology, then the notion of convergence remains the same. Indeed, letting xE denote the product-topology closure of
E, we have Cpi .E/  Cpi . xE/ and Eı;k D . xE/ı;k .
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type to have, at each order k, a ı-neighborhood that is common-.p   .ı; ı//-belief for all types
that lie sufficiently far in the tail of the sequence, where “sufficiently far” depends on ı and on the
order k, but is independent of the event E and the degree of common belief p.
To shed light on the definition, it is useful to begin with a formal analogy with product con-
vergence. Recall that a sequence of types tni converges to a type ti in the product topology if and
only if for every ı > 0 and k > 1 there exists N > 1 such that for every n > N , p 2 Œ0; 1 and
measurable set E  ,32
ti 2 Bpi .E/ H) tni 2 Bp ıi .Eı;k/:
Thus, the definition of convergence in common beliefs formally replaces the belief operator Bpi
in the characterization of product convergence above, by the common belief operator C pi . This
strengthens product convergence by imposing conditions on the tails of the belief hierarchy, which
are irrelevant for product convergence. Indeed, convergence in common beliefs implies product
convergence, because setting p D .p; 0/ yields Bpi D C pi . As for the connection with strate-
gic convergence, Theorem 2 yields the following corollary, proved in appendix A.5. The result
follows from the fact that uniform weak convergence in every common belief frame (Example 6)
implies convergence in common beliefs, which we establish in appendix A.5 through a sequence
of lemmas.
Corollary 1 (Common belief convergence). Strategic convergence implies convergence in com-
mon beliefs.
However, the converse does not hold, as we show with a striking example presented in ap-
pendix A.6. The corollary and the counterexample shed further light on the robustness problem
by providing a necessary condition for strategic convergence that, albeit not sufficient, is easier
to interpret than the more abstract notion of uniform weak convergence on frames. Furthermore,
they clarify the connection between the strategic topology for rationalizability on the universal
type space and the ex ante strategic topologies for Bayesian equilibrium in common prior type
spaces of the early literature. In particular, the example shows that the equivalence between strate-
gic robustness and common p-beliefs breaks down when we adopt the interim approach.
Finally, our analysis of convergence in common beliefs enables a connection with the notion
of critical and regular types, due to Ely and Pe˛ski (2011). Critical types are those types to which
product convergence fails to imply strategic convergence, while regular types are the non-critical
ones.33 Indeed, Ely and Pe˛ski (2011, Theorem 1) show that a type ti 2 T i is critical if and only
if ti 2 Cp1i .E/ for some p > 0 and some product-closed, proper subset E  . That paper
32This follows directly from the following two facts: (i) the Mertens-Zamir isomorphism i W T i ! .‚  T  i /
becomes a homeomorphism when each T j is endowed with the product topology and .‚  T  i / is endowed with
the topology of weak convergence (as remarked in footnote 15); (ii) the Prohorov metric on .‚  T  i / metrizes the
topology of weak convergence.
33The analogous definition for uniform-strategic convergence is: ti is uniformly critical if there is some sequence
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highlights a tension concerning critical types. On one hand, they are pervasive in applications—
for instance, types in finite type spaces and common prior type spaces (both of which we discuss
in the next section) are examples of critical types. On the other hand, they are topologically small:
Ely and Pe˛ski (2011, Theorem 2) show that the set of regular types is a residual subset of the
universal type space under the product topology. Our next result, proved in appendix A.7, shows
that this tension disappears when one considers strategic genericity.
Corollary 2 (Genericity of Critical Types). The set of critical types is open and dense in the
universal type space under the strategic topology.
At first sight, it might seem appropriate for an analyst with limited knowledge of the players’
higher-order beliefs to hedge against that uncertainty by adopting regular types as his model, for
regular types exhibit continuous rationalizable behavior (by definition). Strikingly, Corollary 2
shows that this is not a robust modeling choice. Suppose that the analyst only knows the true type’s
k-order belief. No matter how large k is, modeling the unknown true type by means of a regular
type with that same k-order belief is always a feasible choice for the analyst, as Theorem 2 in Ely
and Pe˛ski (2011) implies that the set of regular types is dense in the product topology. But, since
critical types are also dense in the product topology, the analyst cannot rule out the possibility
that the true type is critical. Moreover, since the set of critical types is open in the strategic
topology, if the true type is indeed critical and the desired level of prediction accuracy small, the
assumed regular type must deliver inaccurate predictions in some game. To put it differently, while
regularity does shield the analyst against misspecified beliefs of sufficiently high order, it may fail
to deliver robust predictions, because “sufficiently high” is necessarily higher than k when the true
type is critical, a possibility that the analyst cannot exclude.
4 Implications for Finite Models and Common Priors
In this section we examine some implications of our results for two commonly used classes of
models, namely finite type spaces and common prior type spaces.
4.1 Finite Types
It is common, in both theoretical and applied work, to model incomplete information scenarios
by positing a finite type space. In addition to advantages in terms of tractability, this simplifying
assumption has received some justification since Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) show that
finite types, those belonging to a finite type space, are dense in the universal type space under the
that converges to ti in the product topology but fails to converge uniform-strategically. An immediate implication of
our Theorem 1 is that all types in the universal type space are uniformly critical, since for every type ti there is always
a sequence that converges to ti in the product topology but does not converge uniform-weakly.
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strategic topology. That is, the strategic behaviors of any type can be approximated by the strategic
behaviors of finite types.34
As we have seen above, strategic convergence is a strictly stronger condition than convergence
in common beliefs. However, when the limit type is a finite type, we show that common belief
convergence implies uniform weak convergence. We thus have the following theorem, proved in
appendix A.8.
Theorem 3. Given a finite type ti and a sequence of (possibly infinite) types tni , the following
statements are equivalent:
(a) tni ! ti uniform-weakly;
(b) tni ! ti uniform-strategically;
(c) tni ! ti strategically;
(d) tni ! ti uniform-weakly on every frame;
(e) tni ! ti in common beliefs.
Thus, when the unperturbed model is finite, any distinction between the uniform strategic
and the strategic topology disappears. Furthermore, we obtain equivalence with common belief
convergence, closing the gap with the literature on ex ante robustness in the case of perturbations
of finite types. In other words, by assuming finite types, the analyst can guarantee robustness of his
predictions to perturbations, provided the perturbations that he contemplates as possible preserve
approximate common beliefs in the sense of Definition 6.
4.2 Common Prior Types
The common prior assumption, according to which the beliefs of all players are derived from
the same prior by conditioning on their private information, is a cornerstone of virtually all mod-
els of information economics. However, its interpretation and methodological justification are
controversial—see Morris (1995), Gul (1998) and Aumann (1998)—, and its positive implica-
tions often puzzling, as witnessed by the celebrated agreement theorem (Aumann, 1976) and the
no-trade theorem that followed it (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Taking a more fundamental ap-
proach to the issue, Lipman (2003) investigates the extent to which models satisfying the assump-
tion approximate models where it is violated, focusing on finite-order beliefs approximations. In
this section we adopt a similar perspective, and apply our characterizations to revisit the problem,
considering also strategic approximations.
34Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010, Theorem 3) show, however, that they are nowhere dense in the uniform
strategic topology.
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We recall the following definition from Mertens and Zamir (1985).
Definition 7. A common prior is a probability measure  2 .‚ T 1  T 2 / such that, for each
player i and measurable sets E  T i and F  ‚  T  i ,
.E  F / D
Z
E
i .F jti /.dti /:
Thus,  is a common prior if, for each player i , the function ti 7! i .F jti / is (a version of)
the conditional probability under  of the event F , given the type of player i . When  assigns
positive probability to a particular type ti , Bayes rule applies given the event E D ftig, and the
equation above can be stated in terms of the usual formula for conditional probability, that is,
i .F jti / D .F jti / WD
.ti  F /
.ti /
:
As noted in Lipman (2003), there are two standard, related approaches to common priors in the
literature. The first follows an ex ante perspective, as it formalizes the common prior assumption
as a property of a type space. Let T denote the family of all type spaces .Ti /i2I such that each set
Ti is closed in the product topology on T i .
Definition 8. A type space .Ti /i2I is a common prior type space if there exists a common prior
 such that, for each player i , the set Ti is the support of the marginal of  on T i .35 Every type
space in T that is not a common prior type space is a non-common prior type space.
The support condition formalizes in a meaningful way the requirement that the beliefs of the
types in Ti are consistent with a common prior. Indeed, as shown in our online appendix Chen, Di
Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2016), there exist common priors whose marginals on T i have the
whole set T i as their supports, hence without the support condition every type space is a common
prior type space.
The second approach, adopted by Lipman (2003), follows the analogous interim perspective
and applies to types.
Definition 9. A type ti 2 T i is a common prior type if there is a common prior  with .ti / > 0.
Every type in T i that is not a common prior type is a non-common prior type.
The positivity condition is needed for the definition of a common prior type to have a minimal
bite—without the condition, every type is a common prior type (see again our online appendix
Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong, 2016). Observe that a finite type space T D .Ti /i2I is a
35This means that Ti is the smallest subset of T i that is closed in the product topology on T i and has probability
1 under  . The faulty message exchange type space of Example 2 becomes a common prior type space, once for each
player i we add the type C .1;1/i .1/ to the set of types of player i .
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common prior type space if and only if, for each player i , each type ti 2 Ti is a common prior
type. That is, in the case of a finite type space, the ex ante and the interim approach deliver the
same formalization of the common prior assumption.
Lipman (2003) shows that the set of finite common prior types is dense in the product topology,
but explicitly warns that this result should not be interpreted as providing a foundation for the
common prior assumption: Although every type can be approximated by a (finite) common prior
type in the product topology, the strategic behavior of that type can be very different from the
strategic behavior of any approximating common prior type. Our next theorem shows that this
lack of robustness is, in effect, a generic phenomenon in the universal type space. In particular,
the denseness result of Lipman (2003) is reversed once we consider the strategic rather than the
product topology. The proof of the result is in appendix A.9.
Theorem 4 (Genericity of non-common prior types). The set of non-common prior types contains
a set of types that is open and dense in T i under the strategic topology.
The fact that the set of non-common prior types contains a (strategically) open set means
that no non-common prior type in that set can be approximated, in terms of strategic behaviors,
by common prior types. Thus, if we cannot exclude that the true type lies in that set, then by
assuming a common prior type we cannot guarantee in advance (i.e. whatever the game is) that
our predictions will be close to those regarding the true type. Now, by denseness, every type is
arbitrarily close (in the strategic topology) to a non-common prior type. Thus, unless we have
sufficiently detailed knowledge of the true type’s strategic behavior in each game, then indeed
we cannot exclude that the true type is a non-common prior type. Strategic genericity of non-
common prior types can then be stated in non-technical terms as follows: By assuming a common-
prior type, a modeler has—from his own, imperfect view of the player’s higher-order beliefs—no
advance guarantee that his predictions will accurately describe the behavior of the true type that
he is trying to approximate.
A caveat of Theorem 4 is that many economic models assume an uncountable common prior
type space with a nonatomic prior, so that no type is a common prior type according to our defini-
tion. Since Theorem 4 does not apply to such cases, it is natural to wonder whether genericity of
non-common priors critically depends on the interim perspective. To address this issue, we now
turn to the ex ante perspective and consider topologies on type spaces rather than types. Specifi-
cally, let T  D i2IT i and identify each type space .Ti /i2I with the rectangle i2ITi  T .
Then T can be viewed as a family of (product-)closed subsets of T . Let d Pi and d Si be any
distances on T i that metrize the product and the strategic topology, respectively.36 For each
36Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) show that the strategic topology on T i is metrizable by the distance d Si
defined as follows. For each game G D .Aj ; gj /j2I , ai 2 Ai and ti 2 T i , let ei .ti ; ai ; G/ D inf
˚
" > 0 W ai 2
Ri .ti ; G; "/
	
. For eachm > 1, write Gm for the set of games where, for every j 2 I , the setAj has at mostm elements.
Then, for each ti ; t 0i 2 T i , d Si .ti ; t 0i / D
P
m > 1 2
 m supGD.Ai ;gi /i2I2Gm maxai2Ai
ˇˇ
ei .ti ; ai ; G/   ei .t 0i ; ai ; G/
ˇˇ
.
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t D .ti /i2I and t 0 D .ti /i2I in T , let
d P.t; t 0/ D max
i2I d
P
i .ti ; t
0
i / and d
S.t; t 0/ D max
i2I d
S
i .ti ; t
0
i /:
The topologies on T that we consider are the Hausdorff topologies on T corresponding to the
distances d P and d S on T . For each T; T 0 2 T and d 2 fd P; d Sg, let
hd .T; T
0/ D max

sup
t2T
inf
t 02T 0 d.t; t
0/ ; sup
t 02T 0
inf
t2T d.t; t
0/

:
Definition 10. The product topology on type spaces is the topology on T induced by the metric
hdP . The strategic topology on type spaces is the topology on T induced by the metric hd S .
In other words, a sequence of type spaces T n converges to a type space T in the product
topology on type spaces if for every ı > 0, k > 1 and sufficiently large n, the k-order belief of
each type in T is ı-close to the k-order belief of some type in T n, and vice versa, the k-order belief
of each type in T n is ı-close to the k-order belief of some type in T . Similarly, T n converges to
T in the strategic topology on type spaces if for every " > 0, game G and sufficiently large n, the
rationalizable actions of each type in T are "-rationalizable for some type in T n, and vice versa,
the rationalizable actions of each type in T n are "-rationalizable for some type in T .
We are now ready to present our last theorem, which we prove in appendix A.9.
Theorem 5 (Genericity of non-common prior type spaces). The set of non-common prior type
spaces contains a set of type spaces that is open and dense in T under both the product topology
and the strategic topology on type spaces.
The theorem highlights a fundamental difference between the ex ante and the interim approach
to common priors. If we change the perspective and consider type spaces as opposed to types, we
obtain again a reversal of Lipman’s (2003) denseness result, even if we still take product con-
vergence as the underlying notion of proximity of types. Moreover, the strategic genericity of
non-common prior types extends to non-common prior type spaces. Thus, common prior mod-
els only serve to approximate a nongeneric set of incomplete information scenarios, whether we
consider the approximation from the interim perspective (Theorem 4) or the ex ante perspective
(Theorem 5). As a consequence of these results, we conclude that there is no general, principled
approach to justify common priors based on strategic approximations.
5 Discussion: Interpretation of Results, and Extensions
5.1 Universal Quantifier over Payoffs
The definition of the strategic topology, on which our robustness exercise is based, has a univer-
sal quantifier over payoff structures. This has important implications for both the interpretation
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and the applicability of our results. As discussed in section 3.3, Theorem 2 provides a practi-
cal criterion for robustness that can be useful in situations where solving for the rationalizability
correspondence globally in the universal type space is impractical. Although the condition is not
necessary for robustness relative to a fixed payoff structure, the theorem shows that the condi-
tion is sharp: there is no way to improve it unless one looks for joint conditions on hierarchies
of beliefs and payoffs. Of course, such a context-free approach comes with a caveat: when the
analyst verifies that the condition fails, he needs to undertake a more in-depth examination of the
robustness problem in the particular strategic context of interest.
In light of this caveat, it is natural to wonder whether it is possible to obtain characterizations
that make more use of the payoff information, while maintaining a reasonable degree of tractabil-
ity. First, consider the extreme opposite of our approach, namely to look for a characterization
of robustness that has complete freedom to depend on the payoff functions of the players. As
discussed in the paragraph following example 8, it may be possible to obtain sufficient conditions
for convergence of rationalizable behavior that depend on the strategic context. As for context-
dependent conditions that are both necessary and sufficient, we do not think they can be insightful
or useful, as they must boil down to a reformulation of the definition of strategic convergence
in the particular game. This issue is not peculiar to multi-agent settings. Already in a decision
theoretic framework à la Savage (one-person game against nature), how does one characterize the
robustness of a decision maker’s choices to sequences of perturbations of his subjective beliefs?
A sharp sufficient condition (when the state space is compact and utilities are continuous) is that
the sequence of perturbations converges to the unperturbed belief of the decision maker in the
topology of weak convergence of probability measures. But if the goal is to find a necessary and
sufficient condition among all those that are allowed to depend on the decision maker’s utility
directly, then no such a characterization exists that will not amount to rephrasing the definition of
robustness relative to the given utility function.
What does seem possible, and extremely desirable, is to develop characterizations of robust-
ness for classes of games. That is, to pursue characterizations that lie between our context-free
approach and the other extreme of full context dependence. One would fix a class of games satis-
fying a certain property, and ask what is the weakest sufficient condition (on sequences of pertur-
bations) for robust predictions in all games satisfying the property. Thus, the characterization is
allowed to rely on some property of payoffs, but not on further details of the payoff functions.37
While developing characterizations for classes of games is important, we anticipate some chal-
lenges. For illustration, consider the following single-agent problem. Assume that the agent has
two actions to choose: high or low. The agent’s payoffs depend on a fundamental variable  that
takes finitely many possible values in the real line. A modeler believes that a single-crossing con-
dition holds: high is strictly better for the agent if  is no less than a fixed cutoff x , while low is
strictly better if  is below x . Thus, only games that satisfy this single-crossing condition (relative
37Such an approach has been pursued recently by Morris, Shin, and Yildiz (2015) in the context of global games.
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to a fixed order on ‚ and a fixed threshold x ) would concern the modeler. Denote this class of
games by G . Say that a sequence of types/beliefs n converges to  G -strategically if for every
game G 2 G and every action a in G, a is a best reply for  in G if and only if for every " > 0
there exists N such that for every n > N , a is an "-best response for n in G. For this class of
decision problems, we can show that G -strategic convergence is equivalent to the following con-
dition: n.f W  > xg/ ! .f W  > xg/ if .f W  > xg/ D 0 or 1, and n./ ! ./ for
every  if .f W  > xg/ 2 .0; 1/.38 While this suggests that characterizing robustness in terms
of beliefs is indeed possible for some classes of games, we note that even for this very simple class
of one-player games satisfying a single-crossing condition the characterization is somewhat un-
wieldy, in that it rests sometimes on beliefs over coarse events, and sometimes on beliefs over fine
events, depending on properties of the limit belief. In general, we do not know what properties of
classes of games are likely to lead to tractable characterizations of robustness in terms of beliefs.
This is an important direction for future research.
It is worth noting that the tension between the sharpness of a sufficient condition and the
complexity of its verification process is rather common in economic theory. A notable example,
which serves as a good analogy to our exercise, is Blackwell’s informativeness theorem on the
comparison of statistical experiments (Blackwell, 1951, 1953). If two experiments, A and B , are
ranked by Blackwell’s criterion so that B is a garbling of A, then the decision maker must earn
a higher expected utility from experiment A than from B . But what if B is not a garbling of A?
Blackwell’s theorem only asserts that there will be some payoff function under which the decision
maker’s payoff from B is higher than from A. Nonetheless, Blackwell’s theorem is generally
regarded as useful, as the garbling condition is both sharp and easy to check.39 The literature on
comparison of statistical experiments has also found it useful to complement Blackwell’s theorem
with analogous results that focus on subclasses of payoffs functions, as in Lehmann (1988) and,
more recently, Quah and Strulovici (2009).
Finally, we remark that there are some settings, such as mechanism design, where it is desir-
able to achieve robustness of strategic behavior for all payoff functions (possibly, in a class).
38A proof is available upon request. Note that belief convergence, i.e., n./ converges to ./ for every  , implies
strategic convergence but it is unnecessarily strong, whereas convergence of n.f W   xg/ to .f W   xg/ and
n.f W  < xg/ to .f W  < xg/ is a necessary requirement, but it is too weak to ensure strategic convergence. To
see the former, note that for  0 and  00 larger than x , the sequence of point masses at  00 converges to the point mass at  0
G -strategically but not in beliefs; to see the latter, consider‚ D f 1; 0; 1g and  D 0 such that u .a; 1/ u  a0; 1 D 2,
u .a; 0/ u  a0; 0 D 1, and u .a; 1/ u  a0; 1 D  2. Let 00 . D 0/, 0 . D 1/, 00 . D  1/, and 0 . D  1/
be all equal to 1=2. Then, 00 and 0 assign the same probability on the events f  } and f < }; however, the
sequence .n/ with n D 00 for every n does not converge to 0 G -strategically.
39Other examples of similar approaches in economic theory are stochastic orders, such as first-order and second-
order stochastic dominance. Also, the revealed preference exercise in decision theory is predicated on similar ideas:
although the analyst might be interested on a small class of decision problems, the axioms typically assume knowledge
of the decision maker’s behavior in a universal domain of decisions that might go well beyond the context of interest.
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5.2 Robustness under Non-Strict Incentives
The definition of strategic convergence, on which our robustness exercise is based, requires that
in every game, every action that is rationalizable for a type remains, for " > 0 arbitrarily small,
"-rationalizable for any type sufficiently far in the tail of the sequence of perturbations. This
condition is equivalent to requiring strictly rationalizable actions for a type to remain rationalizable
for small perturbations. It is thus natural to wonder what can be said regarding stronger notions
of robustness that require rationalizable actions that rely on indifferences to also be robust. The
answer will depend on the notion of robustness. For instance, if we ask what sequences of types
converge in the sense that every action is robustly rationalizable in every game, then nothing
interesting can be said: only constant sequences converge, that is, we get the discrete topology.
Nonetheless, we do think it would be fruitful to study weaker notions of robustness of non-
strictly rationalizable actions, and we believe that the strategic topology should play a central role
in such analysis. What we have in mind is an analogy with the refinements literature on Nash
equilibrium, which aims at characterizing strategies (or connected components of strategies) that
are robust to small perturbations of behavior (the “trembles”), or equivalently, perturbations of
payoffs (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). In the refinements literature, the space of perturbations is
finite-dimensional, so perturbations simply mean convergence in the Euclidean topology, which
also turns out to be the weak topology generated by continuity of the strict Nash equilibrium corre-
spondence. In other words, in the refinements literature, strict equilibria are, by definition, robust.
And the only question is: in a given game, which non-strict equilibria are robust to perturbations
in the topology that renders strict equilibria robust in every game (i.e. the Euclidean topology)? A
similar question can be asked in the context of our exercise, which considers perturbations of the
players’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs. By analogy, it seems natural to expect that in order to
make progress in understanding which (possibly non-strictly) rationalizable actions are robust in
a given game, we first need to understand the weak topology on types generated by the continuity
of the correspondence of strictly rationalizable actions, which is the analogue of the Euclidean
topology used in the refinements literature.
5.3 Extension to Compact-Continuous Games
Interim correlated rationalizability is well defined when the space ‚ and the action sets Ai are
compact metrizable and the payoff functions are continuous: the recursive and fixed-point defini-
tions coincide, and are non-empty valued.
The characterization of the strategic topology in terms of uniform weak convergence on frames
(Theorem 2) continues to hold in the compact-continuous case. The characterization of uniform
strategic convergence (Theorem 1) also remains valid, provided the definition of uniform strategic
convergence is modified to require the rate of convergence to be uniform on all classes of compact
continuous games whose payoffs are not only uniformly bounded, but also equicontinuous in  .
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A Appendix
In the appendix we use the following notations. Given two measurable spacesX; Y and a probabil-
ity measure  2 .X Y /, we write margX  for the marginal of the distribution  on X , that is,
for every measurable E  X , .margX /.E/ D .E  Y /. Given a measurable correspondence
& W X  Y , we define graph & D f.x; y/ 2 XY W y 2 &.x/g. IfX is finite and  is a probability
measure on X , we write supp  to denote the support of , that is, supp  D fx 2 X W .x/ > 0g.
Finally, given a game G D .Ai ; gi /i2I , a probability distribution ˇ 2 .‚  A i / and " > 0,
we write BRi .ˇ;G; "/ for the set of "-best replies to ˇ, that is, the set of all ai 2 Ai such that
gi .ai ; ˇ/ > gi .a0i ; ˇ/   " for all a0i 2 Ai .
A.1 Properties of rationalizability
Our proofs below use the following properties of interim correlated rationalizability. First, in the
definition of the k-order "-rationalizable actions of a type ti we can replace the conjectures of the
form  2 .‚  T  i A i / with those of the form  i W ‚  T  i ! .A i /. The two kinds of
conjectures are related by the disintegration formula:
. E i  a i / D
Z
E i
 i .; t i /Œa i  i .  dt i jti /;
for every  2 ‚, a i 2 A i and measurable subset E i  T  i .40 Thus, Rki .ti ; G; "/ is the set of
all ai 2 Ai for which there is a measurable function  i W ‚  T  i ! .A i / that satisfies:
supp  i .; t i /  Rk 1 i .t i ; G; "/ 8.; t i / 2 ‚  T  i ; (2)Z
‚T  i

gi .ai ;  i .; t i /; /   gi .a0i ;  i .; t i /; /

di .; t i jti / >  " 8a0i 2 Ai :
(See Corollary 1 in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2007.) For future reference, a measurable
function  i that satisfies (2) is called a .k   1/-order "-rationalizable conjecture; a measurable
function  i such that supp  i .; t i /  R i .t i ; G; "/ for every .; t i / 2 ‚T  i is called an
"-rationalizable conjecture.
Second, we can define rationalizability in terms of iterated eliminations of strongly dominated
actions. For each i 2 I and ti 2 T i , let S0i .ti ; G; "/ D Ai and, recursively for k > 1, define
Ski .ti ; G; "/ as the set of all ai 2 Ai such that for every mixed deviation ˛i 2 .Ai / there is a
40Given a  that satisfies marg‚T  i  D 

i .ti /, the disintegration fomula only pins down  i up to a set of i .ti /-
probability zero. But, outside this null set, we can set  i equal to a measurable selection from the correspondence
Rk 1 i .; G; "/, thus ensuring that (2) is satisfied everywhere provided .‚  graphRk 1 i / D 1 (as opposed to almost
everywhere). The fact that such a measurable selection exists follows from the upper hemi-continuity of Rk 1 i .; G; "/
(in the product topology) and the Kuratowsky-Nyll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem.
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conjecture  i W ‚  T  i ! .A i / that satisfies:
supp  i .; t i /  Sk 1 i .t i ; G; "/ 8.; t i / 2 ‚  T  i ; andZ
‚T  i

gi .ai ;  i .; t i /; /   gi .˛i ;  i .; t i /; /

di .; t i jti / >  ": (3)
Then,
Rki .ti ; G; "/ D Ski .ti ; G; "/;
and thus,
Ri .ti ; G; "/ D T
k>1
Ski .ti ; G; "/:
(See Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010), Proposition 1.) Likewise, ai 2 Ri .ti ; G; "/ if
and only if, for every ˛i 2 .Ai /, there is an "-rationalizable conjecture  i W ‚ T  i ! .Ai /
that satisfies (3).
Finally, rationalizability has a characterization in terms of best-reply sets. Say a profile of
correspondences &i W T i  Ai , i 2 I , has the "-best-reply property if for each i 2 I , ti 2 T i
and ai 2 &i .ti / there exists  2 .‚  T  i  A i / such that the following conditions hold:
marg‚T  i D 

i .ti /;
 
margT  iA i

graph & i
 D 1; 41 ai 2 BRi margA i‚;G; ":
Then Ri .; G; "/ is the greatest (w.r.t. pointwise set inclusion) profile of correspondences with the
"-best-reply property.42 (See Claim 2 in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris, 2007.)
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The if direction is proved in Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010). The proof of the only if
direction relies on Lemma 1, Corollary 3 and Lemma 2 below.
We begin with some useful definitions and notations. Given a game G D .Ai ; gi /i2I , say
that an action a0i 2 Ai is a zero action for player i if gi
 
a0i ; a i ; 
 D 0 for all  and a i . An
action profile ac D .aci ; ac i / is a coordination pair if gi
 
aci ; a
c i ; 
 D maxgi for all  and i .
(In particular, any action of player i that is part of a coordination pair is rationalizable for any type
of player i .) Finally, let ˇti ; i 2 .A i ‚/ denote the belief of type ti over actions of player
 i and payoff-relevant parameters, when he has conjecture  i W ‚  T  i ! .A i /, that is,
ˇti ; i
 
a i ; 
 WD Z
T  i
 i .; t i / Œa i  i .  dt i jti / 8.a i ; / 2 A i ‚:
41When graph &i is not measurable, this expression is taken to mean that margT iA i i assigns probability one to
a measurable subset of graph &i .
42Such greatest profile of correspondences is well defined, because the pointwise union of any family of profiles of
correspondences with the "-best-reply property must also have the "-best-reply property.
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The only if part of the theorem is a direct implication of Lemma 2 below. Lemma 1 and
Corollary 3 are intermediate results.
Lemma 1. For every " > 0, integer k > 1, player j and finite set of finite types ftj;1; tj;2; : : : ; tj;N g
 T j , there is a game G D .Ai ; gi /i2I with payoffs in the interval Œ 5; 3, and a set of actions
faj;1; aj;2; : : : ; aj;N g  Aj , such that:
(i) every player i has a zero action a0i 2 Ai ;
(ii) there is a coordination pair ac 2 A1  A2 such that acj …
˚
aj;1; aj;2; :::; aj;N
	
and
gi
 
ai ; a
c i ; 

>  2 for every ai 2 Ai ,  2 ‚ and i 2 I .
(iii) Ri .; G; / D Rki .; G; / for every i 2 I and  2

0; 1
2

;
(iv) for every 1 6 n 6 N , aj;n 2 Rj
 
tj;n; G

;
(v) for every 1 6 n 6 N and sj 2 T j with dkj
 
tj;n; sj

> ", aj;n … Rj
 
sj ; G;
"
2

;
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. Consider first k D 1 and j D 1 (j D 2 can be similarly
proved). Fix a finite set of player 1’s types
˚
t1;1; t1;2; :::; t1;N
	
. Enumerate the nonempty subsets
of ‚ as E1, E2,..., EL. For each .n; `/ 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g  f0; 1; : : : ; Lg consider the function
n;` W ‚! Œ 1; 1 described in the following table:
 2 E`  … E`
` D 0 0 0
` > 1    1   1  E`jt1;n 1  E`jt1;n
Thus, the functions n;` define an auxiliary game between player 1 and Nature, where ` D 0
is a safe bet for player 1, and ` > 1 is a risky bet on the event  … E`. The rewards of the risky
bets are such that:
 any type that has the same first-order beliefs as type t1;n is exactly indifferent between ` D 0
and any ` > 1;
 any type whose first-order belief is different from that of t1;n strictly prefers some risky bet
` > 1 than the safe bet ` D 0.
We use the functions n;` to construct a game G D .Ai ; gi /i2I to prove our claim for k D 1.
In this game,
A1 D
 f1; 2; : : : ; N g  f0; 1; : : : ; Lg P[ ˚a01; ac1	 and A2 D f1; 2; : : : ; N g P[ ˚a02; ac2	 :
Player 1’s payoffs are specified as follows:
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 a01 is a zero action for player 1;
 if player 1 chooses ac1, she gets 3 if player 2 chooses ac2, and gets 0 otherwise (regardless of
 );
 if player 1 chooses .n; `/ 2 f1; : : : ; N g  f0; : : : ; Lg and the state is  , she gets n;` ./ if
player 2 chooses n, and she gets n;` ./   1 if player 2 chooses any action different from
n.
Player 2’s payoffs are specified as follows:
 Player 2 gets 3 if .ac1; ac2/ is chosen (regardless of  ), and gets 0 otherwise.
Thus, when the state is  , we can draw the payoff matrix g.; ; / as follows:
1 2    N a02 ac2
.1; `/ 1;`./; 0 1;` ./   1; 0    1;` ./   1; 0 1;` ./   1; 0 1;` ./   1; 0
.2; `/ 2;` ./   1; 0 2;`./; 0    2;` ./   1; 0 2;` ./   1; 0 2;` ./   1; 0
:::
:::
:::
: : :
:::
:::
:::
.N; `/ N;` ./   1; 0 N;` ./   1; 0    N;` ./ ; 0 N;` ./   1; 0 N;` ./   1; 0
a01 0; 0 0; 0    0; 0 0; 0 0; 0
ac1 0; 0 0; 0    0; 0 0; 0 3; 3
Since n;`./ 2 Œ 1; 1 for all n, ` and  , game G has payoffs bounded between  2 and 3.
We claim that G, along with the actions a1;n WD .n; 0/, n D 1; : : : ; N , satisfy properties (i)–
(v) for k D 1. Properties (i) and (ii) clearly hold. To prove (iii), first note that R2 .; G; / D
R12 .; G; / D A2 for all  > 0. Indeed, the profile of correspondences .&i /i2I , where &2 .t2/ D
A2 and &1 .t1/ D
˚
a01; a
c
1
	
for all t1 and t2, has the  -best reply property. It follows thatR1 .; G; / D
R11 .; G; / for all  > 0. Hence, (iii) holds.
It remains to prove (iv) and (v). First, .n; 0/ is rationalizable for t1;n, since given the conjecture
that player 2 plays n, type t1;n gets 0 by playing .n; `/ for any `:
1
 
E`jt1;n
      1   1  E`jt1;nC  1   1  E`jt1;n  1  E`jt1;n D 0;
and gets at most 0 by playing any action not in f.n; 0/; : : : ; .n; L/g. Thus, (iv) holds for a1;n D
.n; 0/. Second, consider any type s1 with d11
 
t1;n; s1

> ". Then, there exists some 1 6 ` 6 L
such that 1
 
E`jt1;n

> 1
 
E
";0
`
ˇˇ
s1
C " D 1 .E`js1/C ".43 Then, given any conjecture about
the behavior of player 2, the difference in expected payoffs between .n; `/ and .n; 0/ for type s1 is
1.E`js1/ 
    1   1.E`jt1;n/C .1   1.E`js1//  1.E`jt1;n/
D 1.E`jt1;n/   1.E`js1/ > ":
43The equality follows because d0  0 and ‚ is endowed with the discrete metric.
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Hence, a1;n D .n; 0/ is not "-rationalizable for type s1, which proves (v).
We now prove our claim for k C 1 assuming that it holds for k. Again, we assume j D
1, and the proof for j D 2 is similar. Let t1;1; : : : ; t1;N be arbitrary finite types of player 1.
Consider the finite set T2 D
˚
t2;1; t2;2; : : : ; t2;N 0
	
of all types of player 2 that are assigned positive
probability by some t1;n, for n D 1; : : : ; N . By the induction hypothesis, we can find a game
G D .Ai ; gi /i2I , a set of actions
˚
a2;1; a2;2; : : : ; a2;N 0
	  A2, and action profiles a0 and ac in
G, that satisfy properties (i)–(v) relative to the finite set of finite types T2.
Let T k2 D
˚
tk2;1; t
k
2;2; : : : ; t
k
2;N 0
	
be the set of k-order beliefs of types in T2. Enumerate the
nonempty subsets of ‚  T k2 as E1, E2,..., EL. For each 1 6 ` 6 L, define
F` D
n 
a2;n0 ; 
 W 1 6 n0 6 N 0;  ; tk2;n0 2 E`o :
For each .n; `/ 2 f1; : : : ; N g  f0; : : : ; Lg, define a function n;` W A2  ‚ ! Œ 1; 1 as in the
following table:
.a2; / 2 F` .a2; / … F`
` D 0 0 0
` > 1    1   1 E`jt1;n 1 E`jt1;n
We use the game G and the functions n;` to define a new game NG D
  NAi ; Ngi to prove our
claim for k C 1. In this game,
NA1 D A1 P[
 f1; : : : ; N g  f0; 1; : : : ; Lg P[ ˚ Na01	 and NA2 D A2  f0; 1; : : : ; N g :
Player 1’s payoffs are specified as follows (see also the following table):
 Na01 is a zero action for player 1;
 if player 1 chooses a1 2 A1 and the state is  , he gets g1 .a1; a2; / if player 2 chooses
.a2; 0/ 2 A2  f0g, and gets g1
 
a1; a
c
2; 
   3 otherwise.
 if player 1 chooses .n; `/ and the state is  , he gets n;`.ac2;/
2
  1 if player 2 chooses
.a2; 0/ 2 A2  f0g; he gets n;` .a2; / if player 2 chooses .a2; n/ 2 A2  fng; and he gets
n;`
 
ac2; 
   1 if player 2 chooses .a2; m/ 2 A2  fmg with m ¤ n and m ¤ 0.
A2  f0g A2  f1g A2  f2g    A2  fN g
A1 g1 .a1; a2; / g1
 
a1; a
c
2; 
   3 g1  a1; ac2;    3    g1  a1; ac2;    3
.1; `/
1;`.ac2;/
2
  1 1;` .a2; / 1;`
 
ac2; 
   1    1;`  ac2;    1
.2; `/
2;`.ac2;/
2
  1 2;`
 
ac2; 
   1 2;` .a2; /    2;`  ac2;    1
:::
:::
:::
:::
: : :
:::
.N; `/
N;`.ac2;/
2
  1 N;`
 
ac2; 
   1 N;`  ac2;    1    N;` .a2; /
Na01 0 0 0    0
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Player 2’s payoffs are specified as follows:
 If player 2 chooses .a2; m/, he gets g2 .a2; a1; / if player 1 chooses a1 2 A1, and he gets
g2
 
a2; a
c
1; 

otherwise.
By the induction hypothesis, game G satisfies property (ii) and has payoffs in the interval
Œ 5; 3; it follows that game NG also has payoffs in the interval Œ 5; 3.
We now prove that game NG, along with the actions a1;n WD .n; 0/, n D 1; : : : ; N , satisfy
properties (i)–(v) for kC 1. First, (i) follows because Na01 and .a02; n/ are zero actions for players 1
and 2, respectively. Second, (ii) is satisfied by the coordination pair
 
ac1;
 
ac2; 0

: for any Na1 2 NA1
and  2 ‚,
Ng1
  Na1;  ac2; 0 ;  > ming1  a1; ac2;  ;min
n;`
n;`
 
ac2; 

=2   1; 0

>  2I
moreover, Ng2
 
.a2; n/ ; a
c
1; 
 D g2  a2; ac1;  >  2 for any .a2; n/ 2 NA2 and  2 ‚, and
Ng1
 
ac1;
 
ac2; 0

; 
 D Ng2   ac2; 0 ; ac1;  D 3 for any  2 ‚.
The proof of (iii)–(v) relies on the following claim, whose proof is postponed.
Claim 1. For every integer r > 0 and  2 Œ0; 1=2/,
1: Rr1
 ; NG;  \ A1 D Rr1 .; G; /;
2: Rr2
 ; NG;  D Rr2 .; G; /  f0; 1; 2; : : : ; N g.
We now prove that Claim 1 implies properties (iii)–(v).
(iii): By the induction hypothesis, R2 .; G; / D Rk2 .; G; /. Thus, Claim 1 implies that
R2
 ; NG;  D Rk2  ; NG; . This, in turn, implies R1  ; NG;  D RkC11  ; NG;  and hence (iii).
(iv): Given any 1 6 n 6 N , consider the conjecture 2 W ‚  T2 ! . NA2/ such that
2
 
; t2;n0
 
a2;n0 ; n
 D 1 for each n0 D 1; : : : N 0 and  2 ‚. By part 1 of Claim 1 and the
fact that G satisfies property (iv) (by the induction hypothesis), 2 is a rationalizable conjecture in
NG. Moreover, given such a conjecture, t1;n gets an expected payoff of 0 by playing .n; `/ for any
`, and gets at most 0 by playing any action in NA1 n f.n; 0/; : : : ; .n; L/g:
ˇt1;n;2
 
F`
      1   1  E`jt1;nC  1   ˇt1;n;2 F`  1  E`jt1;n
D 1
 
E`jt1;n
      1   1  E`jt1;nC  1   1  E`jt1;n  1  E`jt1;n D 0:
In particular, a1;n D .n; 0/ is a best reply for t1;n.
(v): Fix 1 6 n 6 N and consider any type s1 with dkC11
 
t1;n; s1

> ". Then, there exists
some 1 6 ` 6 L such that
1
 
E`jt1;n

> 1
 
E`
";k ˇˇˇ
s1

C ":
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It follows that, given any "
2
-rationalizable conjecture 2 W ‚  T 2 ! . NA2/, the difference in
expected payoffs between actions .n; `/ and .n; 0/ for type s1 is at least "=2. To prove this, we
consider two cases separately: when player 2 chooses m D n; and when player 2 chooses m ¤ n.
First, conditional on player 2 choosing n, the expected payoff difference between actions .n; `/
and .n; 0/ for type s1, given an arbitrary "2 -rationalizable conjecture 2, isX
a2;
n;`
 
a2; 

ˇs1;2
 
a2; 
ˇˇ
n

D ˇs1;2
 
F`
ˇˇ
n
      1   1  E`jt1;nC  1   ˇs1;2 F`ˇˇn  1  E`jt1;n :
But, for any .; s2/ 2 ‚  T 2 and n0 D 1; : : : ; N 0,
2.; s2/Œa

2;n0 ; n > 0 ) .a2;n0 ; n/ 2 R2

s2; NG; "
2

(since 2 is "2 -rationalizable)
) a2;n0 2 R2

s2; G;
"
2

(by Claim 1)
) dk2 .t2;n0 ; s2/ 6 "; (by the induction hypothesis)
and thus, if ˇs1;2.n/ > 0,
ˇs1;2
 
F`
ˇˇ
n

6 1

.E`/
";k
ˇˇ
s1

;
which impliesX
a2;
n;`
 
a2; 

ˇs1;2
 
a2; 
ˇˇ
n

> 1

.E`/
";k
ˇˇ
s1

     1   1  E`jt1;nC 1   1 .E`/";k ˇˇs1  1  E`jt1;n
D 1
 
E`jt1;n
   1 .E`/";k ˇˇs1 > ":
Second, conditional on player 2 choosing m ¤ n, the expected payoff difference between ac-
tions .n; `/ and .n; 0/ for type s1 (given any conjecture) is at least n;`.ac2; /=2 D 1.E`jt1;n/=2
> "=2. (This is because ac2 ¤ a2;n0 for all n0, and hence .ac2; / … F` for every  .) We
have thus shown that, given any "=2-rationalizable conjecture, and conditional on any choice of
m D 0; : : : ; N by player 2 with ˇs1;2.m/ > 0, type s1 gains at least "=2 by deviating from .n; 0/
to .n; `/. Thus, he also gains "=2 unconditionally on m, and hence property (v) follows.
To conclude the proof, it remains to prove Claim 1. We prove it by induction on r > 0. First,
the claim is trivially true for r D 0. We now consider r > 1, assume that the claim holds for any
0 6 r 0 < r , and prove that it also holds for r .
Rr1 .t1; G; /  Rr1
 
t1; NG; 
 \ A1: Let a1 2 Rr1  t1; NG;  \ A1. Then, there is an .r   1/-
order  -rationalizable conjecture N2 W ‚  T 2 ! 
  NA2 in NG such that for any a01 2 A1,Z
‚T 2
d1.; t2jt1/
X
.a2;n/2 NA2
 Ng1.a1; .a2; n/ ; /   Ng1.a01; .a2; n/ ; / N2 .; t2/ Œ.a2; n/ >  :
(4)
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Consider the mapping '2 W NA2 ! A2,
'2 .a2; n/ D
(
a2, if n D 0;
ac2, if n ¤ 0:
Define 2 as the conjecture inG such that 2 .; t2/ Œa2 D N2 .; t2/

' 12 .a2/

for each .; t2/ 2
‚  T 2 and a2 2 A2. Since N2 is .r   1/-order  -rationalizable in NG, N2 .; t2/ Œ.a2; 0/ > 0 im-
plies .a2; 0/ 2 Rr 12
 
t2; NG; 

, and by the induction hypothesis, a2 2 Rr 12 .t2; G; /. Moreover,
ac2 is part of a coordination pair in G, hence a
c
2 is rationalizable in G for any type. Thus, 2 is an
.r   1/-order  -rationalizable conjecture in G. Moreover, for each a01 2 A1,Z
‚T 2
d1.; t2jt1/
X
.a2;n/2 NA2
 Ng1 .a1; .a2; n/ ; /   Ng1  a01; .a2; n/ ;  N2 .; t2/ Œ.a2; n/
D
Z
‚T 2
d1.; t2jt1/
 X
a22A2

g1 .a1; a2; /   g1
 
a01; a2; 
 N2 .; t2/ Œ.a2; 0/
C  g1  a1; ac2;    3    g1  a01; ac2;    3 N2 .; t2/ ˚.a2; n/ 2 NA2 W n > 0	 
D
Z
‚T 2
d1.; t2jt1/
X
a22A2

g1 .a1; a2; /   g1
 
a01; a2; 

2 .; t2/ Œa2 (5)
Then, (4) and (5) imply a1 2 Rr1 .t1; G; /.
Rr1 .t1; G; /  Rr1
 
t1; NG; 
 \ A1: Let a1 2 Rr1 .t1; G; /. Then, there exists an .r 1/-order
 -rationalizable conjecture 2 W ‚  T 2 ! .A2/ in G such that for each a01 2 A1,Z
‚T 2
d1.; t2jt1/
X
a22A2

g1 .a1; a2; /   g1
 
a01; a2; 

2 .; t2/ Œa2 >  : (6)
Define N2 as the conjecture in NG such that N2 .; t2/ Œ.a2; 0/ D 2 .; t2/ Œa2 for each .; t2/ 2
‚  T 2 and a2 2 A2 (and thus N2 .; t2/ Œ.a2; n/ D 0 for each n > 0). Since 2 is .r   1/-order
 -rationalizable in G , 2 .; t2/ Œa2 > 0 implies a2 2 Rr 12 .t2; G; /, and by the induction
hypothesis, .a2; 0/ 2 Rr 12
 
t2; NG; 

. Hence, N2 is .r   1/-order  -rationalizable in G. We will
now show that a1 is a  -best reply to N2 for t1 in NG. First, by (6) and the definition of N2,Z
‚T 2
d1.; t2jt1/
X
a22A2

g1 .a1; a2; /   g1
 
a01; a2; 
 N2 .; t2/ Œ.a2; 0/ >   8a01 2 A1:
(7)
Second, setting a01 D a01 in (6) and recalling that  < 1=2,Z
‚T 2
d1.; t2jt1/
X
a22A2
g1 .a1; a2; / 2 .; t2/ Œa2 >   >  1=2:
Since n;`
 
ac2; 

=2   1 6  1=2 for all n and `,Z
‚T 2
d1.; t2jt1/
X
a22A2
Œ Ng1 .a1; a2; /   Ng1 ..n; `/; a2; / N2 .; t2/ Œ.a2; 0/ > 0 8n; `:
(8)
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By (7) and (8), a1 is a  -best reply to N2 for t1 in NG, and hence a1 2 Rr1
 
t1; NG; 

.
Rr2
 
t2; NG; 
  Rr2 .t2; G; /  f0; 1; : : : ; N g: Suppose .a2; m/ 2 Rr2  t2; NG; . Then, there
is an .r   1/-order  -rationalizable conjecture N1 W ‚  T 1 ! 
  NA1 in NG such that for each 
a02; m0
 2 NA2,Z
‚T 1
d2.; t1jt2/
X
Na12 NA1
 Ng2 ..a2; m/ ; Na1; /   Ng2   a02; m0 ; Na1;  N1 .; t1/ Œ Na1 >  :
Consider the map '1 W NA1 ! A1 such that
'1 . Na1/ D
8<: Na1 if Na1 2 A1;ac1 if Na1 … A1:
Let 1 be the conjecture in G such that 1 .; t1/ Œa1 D N1 .; t1/

' 11 .a1/

for each .; t1/ 2
‚  T 1 and a1 2 A1. For each Na1 2 A1, since N1 is .r   1/-order  -rationalizable in NG,
N1.; t1/ Œ Na1 > 0 implies Na1 2 Rr 11 .t1; NG; /, and by the induction hypothesis, Na1 2 Rr 11 .t1; G; /.
Moreover, ac1 is part of a coordination pair in G, hence it is rationalizable for any type. Thus, 1
is an .r   1/-order  -rationalizable conjecture in G. Moreover, (4) implies that for each a02 2 A2,
  6
Z
‚T 1
d2.; t1jt2/
X
Na12 NA1
 Ng2 ..a2; m/ ; Na1; /   Ng2   a02; m0 ; Na1;  N1 .; t1/ Œ Na1
D
Z
‚T 1
d2.; t1jt2/
 X
a12A1

g2 .a2; a1; /   g2
 
a02; a1; 
 N1 .; t1/ Œa1
C g2  a2; ac1;    g2  a02; ac1;  N1 .; t1/  NA1nA1 
D
Z
‚T1
d2.; t1jt2/
X
a12A1

g2 .a2; a1; /   g2
 
a02; a1; 

1 .; t1/ Œa1
Therefore, a2 2 Rr2 .t2; G; /.
Rr2
 
t2; NG; 
  Rr2 .t2; G; /  f0; 1; : : : ; N g: Let .a2; m/ 2 Rr2 .t2; G; /  f0; 1; : : : ; N g.
Then, there is an .r   1/-order  -rationalizable conjecture 1 W ‚ T 1 ! .A1/ in G such that
for each a02 2 A2,Z
‚T 1
d2.; t1jt2/
X
a12A1

g2 .a2; a1; /   g2
 
a02; a1; 

1 .; t1/ Œa1 >  : (9)
Let N1 be the conjecture in NG such that N1 .; t1/ Œa1 D 1 .; t1/ Œa1 for each .; t1/ 2 ‚  T 1
and a1 2 A1 (and thus N1 .; t1/ Œa1 D 0 for any a1…A1). Since 1 is .r   1/-order  -
rationalizable in G, 1 .; t1/ Œa1 > 0 implies a1 2 Rr 11 .t1; G; /, and by the induction
hypothesis, a1 2 Rr 11
 
t1; NG; 

. Hence, N1 is .r   1/-order  -rationalizable in NG. Since
Ng2 ..a2; m/ ; a1; / D Ng2 ..a2; m0/ ; a1; / for each m and m0, it follows from (9) that .a2; m/ 2
Rr2
 
t2; NG; 

. 
42
Corollary 3. For every " > 0, player i , positive integer k and finite type ti 2 T i , there exists a
game G and an action ai of player i in G, such that:
(i) Rj .; G; / D Rkj .; G; / for every  2 Œ0;M=10/ and j 2 I ;
(ii) ai 2 Ri .ti ; G/;
(iii) ai … Rki .si ; G;M"=10/ for every si 2 T i with dki .si ; ti / > ".
Proof. Immediate implication of Lemma 1, upon rescaling the payoffs by a factor of M=5. 
Lemma 2. For every " > 0 there exists ı > 0 such that for every i 2 I and ti ; t 0i 2 T i with
d UWi .ti ; t
0
i / > " there is a game G such that Ri .ti ; G/ › Ri .t 0i ; G; ı/.
Proof. Fix an " > 0, a player i , an integer k > 1 and types ti ; t 0i 2 T i with dki .ti ; t 0i / > ". Fix
0 < ı < M"=10 and choose  > 0 small enough that
M."   /
10
  4M > ı: (10)
Since finite types are dense in the product topology, there is a finite type t 00i such that dki .ti ; t 00i / <
. Then, dki .t
00
i ; t
0
i / > " . By Corollary 3, there is a game G0 D .A0i ; g0i /i2I and some action a0i
of player i inG0, such that a0i 2 Ri
 
t 00i ; G0; 0

and a0i … Rki .t 0i ; G0;M." /=10/. By Proposition 2
in Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong (2010), a0i 2 Rki .ti ; G0; 4M/. Then, it follows from (i)
of Corollary 3 that a0i 2 Ri .ti ; G0; 4M/ and a0i … Ri .t 0i ; G0;M."   /=10/.
To conclude, consider the game G D .Aj ; gj /j2I , defined as follows:
Ai D A0i ; A i D A0 i  A0i ;
gi .ai ; .a
 i i ; ai i /; / D
(
g0i .ai ; a i i ; /C 4M W aii D ai i
g0i .ai ; a i i ; / W otherwise;
and
g i ..a i i ; ai i /; ai ; / D g0 i .a i i ; ai ; /:
In game G, player  i is indifferent among all actions ai i ; moreover, player i gets an additional
payoff of 4M whenever his action matches player  i ’s choice of ai i . Therefore, Ri .; G; / D
Ri .; G0;  C 4M/ for every  > 0. In particular, we have that a0i 2 Ri .ti ; G; 0/ and a0i …
Ri .t
0
i ; G;M."   /=10   4M/  Ri .t 0i ; G; ı/, where the inclusion follows from (10).44 
The only if direction of Theorem 1 then follows directly from Lemma 2.
44If necessary, rescale the payoffs from G to ensure jgj j 6 M for every j 2 I , and rescale ı by the same factor.
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A.3 Strategic frames
For each player i and ¿ ¤ A0i  Ai , let
ŒA0i  D
˚
ti W Ri .ti ; G/ D A0i
	
:
Fix any two types ti ; t 0i 2 T i and suppose that i .  ŒA0 i jti / D i .  ŒA0 i jt 0i / for each
 2 ‚ and ¿ ¤ A0i  Ai . We must show that Ri .ti ; G/ D Ri .t 0i ; G/. If ai 2 Ri .ti ; G/ then,
by the characterization of rationalizability in terms of best-reply sets (Appendix A.1), there is a
conjecture  2 .‚  T  i  A i / satisfying marg‚T  i  D i .ti /, .graphR i .; G// D 1
and ai 2 BRi .margA i‚ ;G/. Then, define a conjecture 0 2 .‚  T  i A i / for type t 0i as
follows: for each  2 ‚, a i 2 A i and measurable E  T  i ,
0. E  a i / D
X
A0 i
.  ŒA0 i   a i /
.  ŒA0 i   A i /
i .  .E \ ŒA0 i /jt 0i /;
where the summation ranges over all A0 i  A i such that i .  .E \ ŒA0 i /jt 0i / > 0. Note that
0 is well defined, because i .  .E \ ŒA0 i /jt 0i / > 0 implies .  ŒA0 i   A i / > 0, since
.  ŒA0 i   A i / D i .  ŒA0 i jti / D i .  ŒA0 i jt 0i /: (11)
By construction, we have marg‚T  i 
0 D i .t 0i /. Also, the condition .graphR i .; G// D 1
implies that for every  2 ‚, a i 2 A i and A0 i  A i ,
0.  ŒA0 i   a i / > 0 H) .  ŒA0 i   a i / > 0 H) a i 2 A0 i :
Hence, 0.graphR i .; G// D 1. Finally, (11) above implies margA i‚ 0 D margA i‚ .
Thus, ai 2 BRi .margA i‚ 0; G/, and therefore ai 2 Ri .t 0i ; G/. We have thus shown that
Ri .ti ; G/  Ri .t 0i ; G; /, and the opposite inclusion follows by interchanging the roles of ti and t 0i
in the argument above. This proves that the profile of partitions is indeed a frame.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
We begin with the following auxiliary result about the structure of "-rationalizability.
Lemma 3. Fix a game G D .Ai ; gi /i2I and " > 0. For every integer k > 1, i 2 I and ti 2 T i ,
we have ai 2 Rki .ti ; G; "/ if and only if, for every ˛i 2 .Ai /,X
2‚;BA i
max
a i2B
h
gi .ai ; a i ;/   gi .˛i ; a i ; /
i
 i

 
n
t i W Rk 1 i .t i ; G; "/ D B
oˇˇˇ
ti

>  ": (12)
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Likewise, ai 2 Ri .ti ; G; "/ if and only if, for every ˛i 2 .Ai /,X
2‚;BA i
max
a i2B
h
gi .ai ; a i ;/   gi .˛i ; a i ; /
i
 i

 
n
t i W R i .t i ; G; "/ D B
oˇˇˇ
ti

>  ": (13)
Proof. The first part is equivalent to the iterative definition of interim correlated rationalizability
in terms of dominance, given by condition (3) in Appendix A.1. The second part follows directly
from the first. 
The if direction of the theorem is an immediate consequence of the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Fix ı > 0 and a gameG D .Ai ; gi /i2I and letP denote the strategic frame associated
with G. For every integer k > 0 , i 2 I and ti ; t 0i 2 T i ,
dki;P .ti ; t
0
i / < ı H) Ri .ti ; G/  Rki .t 0i ; G; 4Mı/:
In particular, for every i 2 I and ti ; t 0i 2 T i ,
d UWi;P .ti ; t
0
i / < ı H) Ri .ti ; G/  Ri .t 0i ; G; 4Mı/:
Proof. We need only prove the first result, as the second result is a straightforward implication
of the first one. For k D 0 the result is trivially true, as R0i  Ai . Proceeding by induction,
we assume the result is true for k > 0 and show that it remains true for k C 1. Consider two
types ti ; t 0i with d
kC1
i;P
.ti ; t
0
i / < ı. Fix an arbitrary ai 2 Ri .ti ; G/ and let us show that ai 2
RkC1i .t 0i ; G; 4Mı/. Given ˛i 2 .Ai /, by Lemma 3 we haveX
2‚;BA i
gi
 
; B

i
 
  ŒBˇˇti > 0; (14)
where, for each  2 ‚ and nonempty B  A i ,
ŒB D ˚t i W R i .t i ; G/ D B	;
gi .; B/ D max
a i2B
h
gi .ai ; a i ; /   gi .˛i ; a i ; /
i
:
By Lemma 3, in order to prove that ai 2 RkC1i .t 0i ; G; 4Mı/ we need only show thatX
2‚;BA i
gi
 
; B

i
 
  ŒŒBˇˇt 0i >  4Mı;
where
ŒŒB D ˚t i W Rk i .t i ; G; 4Mı/ D B	 8B  A i :
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To prove this, first note that the induction hypothesis implies
ŒB
ı;k
P

[
CB
ŒŒC  8B  A i : (15)
Second, enumerate the elements of the finite set ‚  ˚B W ¿ ¤ B  A i	 as ˚.n; Bn/	NnD1
(N D j‚j.2jA i j   1/) so that
gi .n; Bn/ > gi .nC1; BnC1/ 8n D 1; : : : ; N   1 (16)
and
.m D n and Bm  Bn/ H) m 6 n:45 (17)
Then, X
2‚;BA i
gi
 
; B

i
 
  ŒŒBˇˇt 0i
>
NX
nD1
gi
 
n; Bn
 
i
 
n  ŒŒBn
ˇˇ
t 0i
   i n  ŒBnˇˇti (18)
D
N 1X
nD1

gi
 
n; Bn
  gi nC1; BnC1

nX
mD1
 
i
 
m  ŒŒBm
ˇˇ
t 0i
   i m  ŒBmˇˇti (19)
D
N 1X
nD1

gi
 
n; Bn
  gi nC1; BnC1


i
 n[
mD1
m  ŒŒBm
ˇˇˇ
t 0i

  i
 n[
mD1
m  ŒBm
ˇˇˇ
ti

(20)
>
N 1X
nD1

gi
 
n; Bn
  gi nC1; BnC1


i
 n[
mD1
m  ŒBm
ı;k
P
ˇˇˇ
t 0i

  i
 n[
mD1
m  ŒBm
ˇˇˇ
ti

(21)
>
N 1X
nD1
 
gi
 
n; Bn
  gi nC1; BnC1    ı (22)
D   gi 1; B1  gi N ; BN ı
>  4Mı; (23)
45Such enumeration is possible because gi .; B 0/ > gi .; B/ whenever B 0  B .
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where (18) follows from (14); (19) follows by a standard “integration by parts” argument; (20)
follows from the fact that
˚
.m; ŒBm/
	N
mD1 and
˚
.m; ŒŒBm/
	N
mD1 are partitions of ‚  T  i ;
(21) follows from (15), (16) and (17); (22) follows from the assumption that dkC1
i;P
.ti ; t
0
i / 6 ı, the
fact that ŒBm 2 P i and (16); and (23) follows from jgi j 6 2M . 
Before turning to the proof of the only if direction of Theorem 2, we introduce some notation.
First, given a frameP and a type ti , let i .ti /
ˇˇ
‚P i denote the belief of type ti over the events in
‚P i . We thus view i .ti /
ˇˇ
‚P i as an element of the finite-dimensional simplex.‚P i /
(viewed as a subset of the Euclidean space Rj‚jjP i j). Second, let 'i W .‚  P i / ! Pi
designate the function that maps each q 2 .‚  P i / into Pi .ti /, where ti is some type with
i .ti /
ˇˇ
‚P i D q. Since P is a frame, the definition of 'i is independent of the choice of ti .
Third, given a game G D .Ai ; gi /i2I , for each ˇi 2 .Ai ‚/ define a probability distribution
ˇPi 2 .‚ Pi / as follows:
ˇPi .; E/ D
X
ai2' 1i .E/
ˇi .ai ; / 8.; E/ 2 ‚ Pi :
The proof of the only if direction of Theorem 2 relies on Lemmas 5 and 6 and Corollary 4
below.
Lemma 5. Fix a frame P . For each  > 0 there exist " > 0 and a game G D .Ai ; gi /i2I such
that for each i 2 I ,
(i) Ai is a finite subset of .‚  P i / that is p"-dense (relative to the Euclidean norm jj  jj)
in every element of the partition
˚
' 1i .E/ W E 2 Pi
	
;
(ii) for each a i , a0 i 2 A i ,
' i .a i / D ' i .a0 i / H) gi .ai ; a i ; / D gi .ai ; a0 i ; / 8 2 ‚; ai 2 Ai I
(iii) for each ˇ i 2 .A i ‚/,
BRi .ˇ i ; G; "/ 
˚
ai 2 Ai W jjai   ˇP i jj <
p
"
	I
(iv) for each ˇ i , ˇ0 i 2 .A i ‚/ with jjˇP i   ˇ0P i jj > ,
BRi .ˇ
0 i ; G; 2"/ \
˚
ai 2 Ai W jjai   ˇP i jj <
p
"
	 D ¿:
Proof. Fix  > 0 and a frame P . Let 0 < " < 2=.1 C p3/2. Cover the finite-dimensional
simplex.‚P i / by a finite union of open balls B1; : : : ; BN of diameterp". Select one point
from Bn \ ' 1i .E/, for each n D 1; : : : ; N and E 2 Pi , and let Ai denote the set of selected
points. By construction, Ai satisfies (i).
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Consider the quadratic score si W .‚ P i / ‚ P i ! R,
si .q; ; E/ D 2q.;E/   jjqjj2 8.q; ; E/ 2 .‚ P i / ‚ P i ;
which can be readily shown to satisfy
si .q; q/   si .q0; q/ D jjq0   qjj2 q; q0 2 .‚ P i /: (24)
Then, define gi W Ai  A i ‚! R,
gi .ai ; a i ; / D si .ai ; ; ' i .a i // 8.ai ; a i ; / 2 Ai  A i ‚;
which clearly satisfies (ii).
Given ˇ i 2 .A i ‚/ and ai 2 Ai with jjai   ˇP i jj <
p
", for any a0i 2 Ai we have
gi .ai ;ˇ i /   gi .a0i ; ˇ i /
D si .ai ; ˇP i /   si .a0i ; ˇP i / .by (ii)/
D si .ai ; ˇP i /   si .ˇP i ; ˇP i /C si .ˇP i ; ˇP i /   si .a0i ; ˇP i /
D  jjai   ˇP i jj2 C jja0i   ˇP i jj2 .by (24)/
>  "; .by jjai   ˇP i jj <
p
"/
hence ai 2 BRi .ˇ i ; G; "/, and this proves (iii).
Turning to (iv), let ˇ i , ˇ0 i 2 .A i  ‚/ with jjˇ0P i   ˇP i jj >  and ai 2 Ai with
jjai   ˇP i jj <
p
". Then, jjai   ˇ0P i jj >   
p
" >
p
3". By (i) we can find some a0i 2 Ai with
jja0i   ˇ0P i jj <
p
". Thus,
gi .ai ;ˇ
0 i /   gi .a0i ; ˇ0 i /
D si .ai ; ˇ0P i /   si .a0i ; ˇ0P i / .by (ii)/
D si .ai ; ˇ0P i /   si .ˇ0P i ; ˇ0P i /C si .ˇ0P i ; ˇ0P i /   si .a0i ; ˇ0P i /
D  jjai   ˇ0P i jj2 C jja0i   ˇ0P i jj2 .by (24)/
<  3"C " D  2";  by jjai   ˇ0P i jj > p3"
and jja0i   ˇ0P i jj <
p
"

and hence ai … BRi .ˇ0 i ; G; 2"/, as required. 
Lemma 6. Fix ı > 0 and a frame P . Let " > 0 and G D .Ai ; gi /i2I satisfy the properties
(i)–(iv) of Lemma 5 relative to  D ı=.j‚j maxi jPi j/: Then the following statements hold:
(a) for every i 2 I and ti 2 T i ,
R.ti ; G; "/ 
n
ai 2 Ai \ ' 1i
 
Pi .ti /
 W ˇˇˇˇai   i .ti /ˇˇ‚P i ˇˇˇˇ < p"oI
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(b) for every integer k > 0, i 2 I and ti ; t 0i 2 T i with dki;P .ti ; t 0i / > ı,
Rki .t
0
i ; G; 2"/ \
n
ai 2 Ai \ ' 1i
 
Pi .ti /
 W ˇˇˇˇai   i .ti /ˇˇ‚P i ˇˇˇˇ < p"o D ¿:
Proof. To prove (a), we show that the pair of correspondences &i W T i  Ai , i 2 I , defined by
&i .ti / D
n
ai 2 Ai \ ' 1i
 
Pi .ti /
 W ˇˇˇˇai   i .ti /ˇˇ‚P i ˇˇˇˇ < p"o 8ti 2 T i ;
which is nonempty-valued by (i) of Lemma 5, has the "-best-reply property. Indeed, given any
ai 2 &i .ti / and any conjecture  i W ‚T  i ! .A i / with supp  i .; t i /  & i .t i / for all
.; t i / 2 ‚  T  i , we must have
ˇti ; i

   A i \ ' 1 i .E/ D i   Ejti 8 2 ‚;E 2 P i ;
and hence, jjai ˇPti ; i jj D
ˇˇˇˇ
ai i .ti /
ˇˇ
‚P i
ˇˇˇˇ
<
p
", by (i) of Lemma 5. It then follows by (iii)
of Lemma 5 that ai 2 BRi .ˇti ; i ; G; "/. We have thus shown that the profile of correspondences
.&i /i2I has the "-best-reply property.
Turning to (b), since d0
i;P
 0 the result is true for k D 0 (vacuously). Proceeding by
induction, assume the result is true for k > 0 and let us show that it remains true for k C 1. Fix
i 2 I and ti ; t 0i 2 T i with dkC1i;P .ti ; t 0i / > ı. Then, there exist  2 ‚ and E 2 P i such that
i
 
 Eı;k
P
ˇˇ
t 0i

< i
 
 E ˇˇti   ı=.j‚j  jP i j/: (25)
Consider an arbitrary k-order 2"-rationalizable conjecture  i W ‚  T  i ! .A i /. By
the induction hypothesis, for every t i ; t 0 i 2 T  i , every  2 ‚ and every a i 2 A i withˇˇˇˇ
a i    i .t i /
ˇˇ
‚Pi
ˇˇˇˇ
<
p
", we can have  i .; t 0 i /Œa i  > 0 only if dk i;P .t i ; t
0 i / 6 ı. In
particular, for every t i ; t 0 i 2 T  i ,  2 ‚ and a i 2 A i , 
 i .t i /
ˇˇ
‚Pi D a i and d
k
 i;P .t i ; t
0 i / > ı
 H)  i .; t 0 i /Œa i  D 0:
It follows that for every .; t 0 i / 2 ‚  T  i ,
t 0 i … Eı;kP H)  i .; t 0 i /

A i \ ' 1 i .E/
 D 0; (26)
since for every a i 2 A i \ ' 1 i .E/ and every t i 2 T  i with  i .t i /
ˇˇ
‚Pi D a i we must
have t i 2 E. Hence, for every k-order 2"-rationalizable conjecture  i we have
ˇt 0
i
; i

   A i\' 1 i .E/
D
Z
T  i
 i .; t 0 i /

A i \ ' 1 i .E/

i
 
  dt 0 i
ˇˇ
t 0i

D
Z
E
ı;k
P
 i .; t 0 i /

A i \ ' 1 i .E/

i
 
  dt 0 i
ˇˇ
t 0i

.by (26)/
6 i
 
 Eı;k
P
ˇˇ
t 0i

< i . Ejti /   ı=.j‚j  jP i j/; .by (25)/
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and thus,
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇP
t 0
i
; i   

i .ti /
ˇˇ
‚P i
ˇˇˇˇ
> . It follows from part (iv) of Lemma 5 that
RkC1i .t
0
i ; G; 2"/ \
˚
ai W
ˇˇˇˇ
ai   i .ti /
ˇˇ
‚P i
ˇˇˇˇ
<
p
"
	 D ¿;
as was to be shown. 
Corollary 4. For every frame P and ı > 0 there exists " > 0 and a game G such that, for every
i 2 I and ti ; t 0i 2 T i , if d UWi;P .ti ; t 0i / > ı then Ri .ti ; G/ › Ri .t 0i ; G; "/.
Proof. A straightforward implication of Lemma 6 is that there exist " > 0 and a game G0 such
that, for every i 2 I and ti ; t 0i 2 T i , if d UWi;P .ti ; t 0i / > ı then Ri .ti ; G0; "/ › Ri .t 0i ; G0; 2"/. To
conclude, we can use a construction similar to the last part of the proof of Lemma 2 to obtain a
game G with Ri .; G; / D Ri .; G0;  C "/ for all  > 0. 
The only if direction of Theorem 2 is an immediate implication of Corollary 4.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 1
We begin with the following definition. Given a frame P and a finite measurable partition …i of
the finite-dimensional simplex .‚  P i /, define the partition on T i induced by …i , written
T i =…i , as follows: any two types of player i belong to the same element of T i =…i if and
only if their beliefs over ‚  P i belong to the same element of …i . The following lemma is
straightforward from the definitions, and the proof is ommitted:
Lemma 7. Each T i =…i is a measurable partition of T i , and the join .Pi _ .T i =…i //i2I is a
frame.46
We now need the following piece of notation. Given an integer m > 1, a measurable subset
E   and p 2 Œ0; 12, define the event that E is m-order p-belief recursively as follows:
Bp
m
.E/
defD Bp

E \ Bpm 1.E/;
where

Bp
0
.E/
defD . Then, the event thatE ism-order p-belief for player i , written Bpi m.E/,
is the projection of

Bp
m
.E/ onto T i . We these definitions in place, we have:
C p.E/ D
\
m > 1

Bp
m
.E/ and C pi .E/ D
\
m > 1

B
p
i
m
.E/:
Lemma 8. For every integer k > 1 and ı > 0 there exists a k-order frame P such that, for every
i 2 I , every atom of Pi has dki -diameter at most ı.
46Recall that the join of a pair of partitions, denoted by the symbol _, is the coarsest partition that is finer than both
partitions in the pair.
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Proof. For k D 1 the result is trivial, as any profile of first-order measurable partitions is a frame.
Proceeding by induction, consider k > 1, fix ı > 0 and let P be a k-order measurable frame
whose atoms all have dki -diameter less than ı=2. Let …i be a finite partition of the simplex
.‚  P i / (viewed as a subset of the Euclidean space Rj‚jjP i j) into finitely many Borel
measurable subsets with Euclidean diameter less than ı=
pj‚j  jP i j. By Lemma 7, the join
.Pi _ .…i=T i //i2I is a .k C 1/-order frame. We claim that every atom of Pi _ .…i=T i /
has dkC1i -diameter less than ı. Let ti and t 0i be two types with t 0i 2
 
T i =…i

.ti /, let E be a
measurable subset of‚ T  i and let us show that i .Eı;kjt 0i / > i .Ejti /  ı. Since each atom
of P i has dki -diameter less than ı=2, there is some F 2 2‚ ˝ P i with E  F  Eı=2;k .
Then, ji .F jt 0i /   i .F jti /j < ı, because each atom of …i has Euclidean diameter less than
ı=
pj‚j  jP i j and we have t 0i 2  T i =…i.ti /. Thus,
i .Eı;kjt 0i / > i .F ı=2;kjt 0i / .by F  Eı=2;k/
> i .F jt 0i / .by F  F ı=2;k/
> i .F jti /   ı .by ji .F jt 0i /   i .F jti /j < ı/
> i .Ejti /   ı .by E  F /
as claimed. 
Lemma 9. Fix ı > 0, an integer k > 1 and a k-order frameP whose atoms all have dki -diameter
less than ı for every i 2 I . Then, for every m D 0; : : : ; k,
dmi .ti ; t
0
i / 6 dmi;P .ti ; t
0
i /Cmı 8i 2 I; 8ti ; t 0i 2 T i :
Proof. Fix ı > 0, an integer k > 1 and a k-order frame P whose atoms all have dki -diameter less
than ı, for every i 2 I . (Such a frame exists by Lemma 8.) Form D 0 the conclusion of the lemma
is trivial, as d0i D d0i;P D 0. Consider 1 6 m 6 k and assume the conclusion of the lemma holds
for m   1. Let ti ; t 0i 2 T i and  > dmi;Pi .ti ; t 0i / and let us show that dmi .ti ; t 0i / 6  C mı.
Fix E 2 2‚ ˝ P i . Since all the atoms of P i have dk i -diameter less than ı, there is some
F 2 2‚ ˝P i with E  F  Eı;m 1. Then,
i .ECmı;m 1jt 0i / > i .F C.m 1/ı;m 1jt 0i / .by F  Eı;m 1/
> i .F
;m 1
P
jt 0i / .by dm 1 i 6 dm 1 i;P C .m   1/ı/
> i .F jti /    .by  > dmi;Pi .ti ; t 0i //
> i .Ejti /     mı; .by E  F /
and hence, dmi .ti ; t
0
i / 6 Cmı. But since our choice of  > dmi;Pi .ti ; t 0i / was arbitrary, we have
shown that dmi .ti ; t
0
i / 6 dmi;Pi .ti ; t
0
i /Cmı, as required. 
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Lemma 10. Fix ı > 0, a frame zP and a finite set P  Œ0; 12. Let P denote the common belief
frame 
QPi _
_
p;E
˚
C
p
i .E/; T

i n C pi .E/
	
i2I
;
where the join ranges over all p 2 P and E 2 2‚ ˝ zP1 ˝ zP2. Then, for every pair of integers
k > ` > 1, every p 2 P and every E 2 2‚ ˝ zP1 ˝ zP2, 
C
p
i .E/
ı;`
P

h
B
p .ı;ı/
i
i` k 
E
ı;k
QP
 8i 2 I:
Proof. We fix k > 1, E 2 2‚˝ zP1˝ zP2 and p 2 P and prove the result by induction on ` > k.
First, the result is trivial for ` D k, as Bp .ı;ı/i 0./ D T i for every i . Next, suppose the result
is true for ` > k and let us show that it remains true for `C 1. Pick ti 2 C pi .E/ and t 0i 2 T i with
d `C1
i;P
.ti ; t
0
i / < ı and let us show that
t 0i 2 Bpi ıi

E
ı;k
QP \

Bp .ı;ı/
` k 
E
ı;k
QP
 D hBp .ı;ı/i i`C1 k Eı;kQP : (27)
Indeed,47
i
  
E
ı;k
QP \

Bp .ı;ı/
` k 
E
ı;k
QP

t 0
i
ˇˇ
t 0i

> i
   
E \ C p.E/ı;`
P

t 0
i
ˇˇ
t 0i

> i
   
E \ C p.E/
ti
ı;`
P
ˇˇ
t 0i

> i
  
E \ C p.E/
ti
ˇˇ
ti
   ı
> pi   ı;
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that dk
i; zP 6 d
`
i;P
, the
second from d `
i;P
.ti ; t
0
i / < ı, the third from d
`C1
i;P
.ti ; t
0
i / < ı, and the last from ti 2 C pi .E/ D
B
pi
i .E \ C p.E//. This proves (27). 
Lemma 11. For every ı > 0 and integer k > 1 there exists a common belief frame P such that
for every ti ; t 0i 2 T i , if d UWi;P .ti ; t 0i / < ı, then for every p 2 Œ0; 12 and measurable E  ,
ti 2 C pi .E/ H) t 0i 2 C p ı.kC2/1i
 
Eı.kC2/;k

:
Thus, uniform-weak convergence in every common belief frame implies convergence in common
beliefs.
Proof. Fix ı > 0, an integer k > 1 and a finite subset P  Œ0; 12 with the property that for every
p 2 Œ0; 12 there exists q 2 P with p > q > p   .ı; ı/. Let zP be a k-order frame whose atoms
47Recall that, for any measurable subset E   and any type ti of player i , Eti denotes the section of E over ti .
See Section 2.4.
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have dki -diameter at most ı, for every player i . Such a frame exists by Lemma 8. Consider the
associated common belief frame P constructed as in Lemma 10:
QPi _
_
p;E
˚
C
p
i .E/; T

i n C pi .E/
	
i2I
;
where the join ranges over all p 2 P and E 2 2‚ ˝ zP1 ˝ zP2.
Fix i 2 I , a pair of types ti , t 0i 2 T i with d UWi;P .ti ; t 0i / < ı, an event E   and p 2 Œ0; 12
with ti 2 C pi .E/. Pick q 2 P with p > q > p   .ı; ı/ and F 2 2‚ ˝ zP1 ˝ zP2 such that
E  F  Eı;k . (Such an event F exists, as the atoms of zP have dki -diameter at most ı.) Then,
t 0i 2
\
` > k
 
C
p
i .F /
ı;`
P

\
m > 1
h
B
q ı1
i
im 
F
ı;k
QP

(by d UWi;P .ti ; t
0
i / < ı, q 6 p and Lemma 10)
D Cq ı1i
 
F
ı;k
QP

(by the definition of common belief)
 Cq ı1i
 
F .kC1/ı;k

(by Lemma 9)
 C p 2ı1i
 
E.kC2/ı;k

; (by F  Eı;k and q > p   .ı; ı/)
and hence t 0i 2 C p .kC2/ı1i
 
E.kC2/ı;k

. 
It follows from Lemma 11 that uniform-weak convergence relative to every frame implies
convergence in common beliefs. Thus, by Theorem 2, strategic convergence implies convergence
in common beliefs, as was to be shown.
A.6 A sequence converging in common beliefs but not strategically
We construct an example of a sequence of types tn1 that converges in common beliefs to a type t1,
but does not converge uniform-weakly on a frame and hence, by Theorem 2, does not converge
strategically. To construct the sequence, fix 0 2 ‚ and 0 < p < q < 1. For each player i , pick a
type ri that satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) ri assigns probability zero to state 0;
(ii) for every product-closed proper subset E   and  > 0, ri … C 1i .E/.48
Let si and ti be the types who assign probability one to 0 and whose beliefs about the other
player’s types are as specified in Figure 4 below.
48Types that satisfy these conditions exist. Ely and Pe˛ski (2011, Theorem 1) show that the types that satisfy property
(ii) are precisely those types to which product convergence is equivalent to strategic convergence, called regular types.
They show that the set of regular types is a residual subset of the universal type space (in the product topology), in
particular a non-empty set. As for condition (i), note that any type of player i that assigns probability one to some
.; u i /, where u i is a type of player  i that satisfies property (ii), must also satisfy property (ii). This implies the
existence of types satisfying both (i) and (ii).
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t1
q
1   q
Q
Q
Q
r2
t2
p
1   p
Q
Q
Q
r1
s1
p
1   p
Q
Q
Q
r2
s2
p
1   p
Q
Q
Q
r1
t1
Figure 4: The types si and ti .
Since r1 and r2 satisfy property (ii) above, for every p 2 .0; 12, every product-closed proper
subset E  , and every i 2 I ,
ti 2 C pi .E/ ” p 6 .p; p/ and E  0  fs1; t1g  fs2; t2g: (28)
In particular, no nontrivial event is common .q; p/-belief at t1.
The construction of the sequence mimics the structure in Figure 4. Fix 0 <  6 q p and for
each player i define sni and t
n
i as follows: let t
1
1 D r1 and, for each n > 1, let sn2 , sn1 , tn2 and tnC11
be the types who assign probability one to 0 and whose beliefs about the other player’s types are
as described in Figure 5 below.
tnC11

1   q
Q
Q
Q



r2
q  
t2
tn2
p
1   p
Q
Q
Q
r1
sn1
p
1   p
Q
Q
Q
r2
sn2
p
1   p
Q
Q
Q
r1
tn1
Figure 5: The sequences of types sni and t
n
i .
The sequence tn1 converges to t1 in common beliefs. To see why, first note that t
n
1 ! t1 in
the product topology: by the construction in Figures 4 and 5, s12 has the same first-order belief
as s2, hence s11 has the same second-order belief as s1, which implies t
1
2 has the same third-order
belief as t2, and so forth. Second, given an arbitrary ı > 0, by the construction in Figure 5 and the
product-convergence tn1 ! t1, for each integer k > 1 we have tn1 2 Bq 1
 
0  ft1gı;k  t2

for
all n large enough. Since t2 2 C .p;p/2
 
0  fs1; t1g  fs2; t2g

and q   > p, it follows that for
all n large enough,
tn1 2 Bp1

0  ft1gı;k C .p;p/2
 
0  fs1; t1g  fs2; t2g
  C .p;p/1  0  fs1; t1g  fs2; t2gı;k:
It follows, by (28) and footnote 6, that tn1 ! t1 in common beliefs, as claimed.
It remains to exhibit a frame P such that tn1 6! t1 uniform-weakly on P . For each r D
.r1; : : : ; r4/ 2 .0; 14, i 2 I and measurable subset E  , let

M ri
0
.E/ D , and for each
k > 1, define recursively
M ri
k
.E/ D Br1i
 
E \ Br2 i
 
E \ Br3i
 
E \ Br4 i
 
E \ M ri k 1.E/:
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Note that
M ri
k
.E/  Br1i

E \
h
M
.r2;r3;r4;r1/ i
ik 1
.E/

 M ri k 1.E/ 8k > 1: (29)
For each k > 1, let
P k1 D
h
M
.q;p;p;p/
1
ik
.0/; Q
k
1 D
h
M
.p;p;q;p/
1
ik
.0/;
P k2 D
h
M
.p;p;p;q/
2
ik
.0/; Q
m
2 D
h
M
.p;q;p;p/
2
ik
.0/
and finally,
Pi D
1T
kD1
P ki and Qi D
1T
kD1
Qki 8i 2 I:
Let P be the profile of partitions .Pi /i2I ,
Pi D
˚
Pi nQi ;Qi nPi ; Pi \Qi ; T i n.Pi [Qi /
	 8i 2 I:
To verify that P is a frame, note that (29) implies
P k1  Bq1 .0  P k 12 /  P k 11 8k > 1
and hence
P1 D
1T
kD2
P k1 
1T
kD2
B
q
1 .0  P k 12 / D Bq1 .0  P2/ 
1T
kD2
P k 11 D P1:
Therefore, P1 D Bq1 .0  P2/. By analogous arguments,
Q1 D Bp1 .0 Q2/; P2 D Bp2 .0 Q1/; and Q2 D Bp2 .0  P1/:
Thus, for all i 2 I and ti 2 T i , the element of Pi containing ti is determined by the values
i .0  P i jti / and i .0  Q i jti /, and hence, a fortiori, by the restriction of i .jti / to
‚ P i . This shows that P is a frame.
We now prove that tn1 does not converge to t1 uniform weakly on P . Fix 0 < ı < minfp;g.
It is enough to show that for every positive integer n,
d4n 31;P .t1; t
n
1 / > ı; d
4n 2
2;P .s2; s
n
2 / > ı; d
4n 1
1;P .s1; s
n
1 / > ı; d
4n
2;P .t2; t
n
2 / > ı: (30)
To prove this, we show that the first inequality holds for n D 1, that for each n > 1, if the first
inequality holds for n, then all others also hold for n, and finally that if the last inequality holds
for n, then the first holds for nC 1. In the proof we use the following facts, which are immediate
from the definition of t1, t2, s1, s2 and the fact that i .0jri / D 0 and Pi [ Qi  Bpi .0/ for
each i 2 I :
t1 2 P1; s1 2 Q1; s2 2 Q2; t2 2 P2; ri … .Pi [Qi /ı;1P 8i 2 I: (31)
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Since 1.0jt1/ D 1 and 1.0jt11 / D 0, we have d11;P .t1; t11 / D 1 > ı, which proves the first
inequality in (30) for n D 1. Now fix any n > 1 and assume the first inequality in (30) holds
for n. Then, by (31), ftn1 ; r1g \ .P1/ı;4n 3P D ¿. Since 2.0  ftn1 ; r1gjsn1 / D 1 and, by
(31), 2.0  P1js2/ D 2.0; t1js2/ D p, it follows that d4n 22;P .s2; sn2 / > p > ı. Thus, the
second inequality in (30) holds for n. The latter implies, by (31), fsn2 ; r2g \ .P2/ı;4n 2P D ¿,
and since 1.0  fsn2 ; r2gjsn1 / D 1 and, by (31), 1.0  Q2js1/ D 1.0; s2js1/ D p, we
also have d4n 1
1;P
.s1; s
n
1 / > p > ı, that is, the third inequality in (30) holds for n. This in turn
implies, by (31), fsn1 ; r1g \ .P1/ı;4n 1P D ¿, and since 2.0  fsn1 ; r1gjtn2 / D 1 and, by (31),
2.0  Q1jt2/ D 1.0; s1jt2/ D p, we obtain d4n2;P .t2; tn2 / > p > ı. This proves that the
fourth inequality in (30) holds for n, and hence, by (31), that ftn2 ; r2g \ .P2/ı;4nP D ¿. It remains
to show that the latter implies that the first inequality in (30) holds for n C 1. Indeed, since
1.0  ftn2 ; r2gjtnC11 / D 1  qC and, by (31), 1.0 P2jt1/ D 1.0; t2jt1/ D q, we have
d4nC1
1;P
.t1; t
nC1
1 / >  > ı, as claimed.
A.7 Proof of Corollary 2
An immediate implication of Ely and Pe˛ski (2011, Theorem 1) is that every finite type is critical.
This fact, together with the denseness of finite types in the strategic topology (Dekel, Fudenberg,
and Morris, 2006), implies that the set of critical types is dense in the strategic topology.
Next, we show that the set of critical types is open in the strategic topology, or equivalently,
that the set of regular types is closed. Suppose not. Then, there is a sequence of regular types tni
that converges to some critical type ti . By Ely and Pe˛ski (2011, Theorem 1), there is some p > 0
and some product-closed, proper subset E   with ti 2 Cp1i .E/. Then, there is an integer
k > 1 and ı 2 .0; p/ such that the dki -closure of Eı;k is a proper subset of . Moreover, by
Corollary 1, tni ! ti in common beliefs, and hence tni 2 C .p ı/1i .Eı;k/ for all n large enough. It
follows, again by Ely and Pe˛ski (2011, Theorem 1), that tni is a critical type for all n large enough,
and this is a contradiction. The contradiction shows that the set of regular types is closed.
A.8 Proof of Theorem 3
Since the implications .a/ , .b/ ) .c/ , .d/ ) .e/ follow from Theorems 1, 2 and from
Corollary 1, it is enough to prove the implication .e/ ) .a/. The latter is an immediate conse-
quence of the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Let .T1; T2/ be a finite type space. There exist  > 0 and k > 1 such that for each
ı 2 .0; /, " 2 Œ0; 1/, m > 0, i 2 I and .ti ; t 0i / 2 Ti  T i with dki .ti ; t 0i / < ı, one has
t 0i 2

B
.1 ";1 "/
i
m 
‚  T ı;k1  T ı;k2
 ) dkCmi .ti ; t 0i / < ı C " : (32)
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Proof. Choose k > 1 and  > 0 so that, for each i 2 I and ti ; t 0i 2 Ti , if dk 1i .ti ; t 0i / < 2 then
t 0i D ti . Since T1 and T2 are finite, such k and  exist. Fix ı 2 .0; /. Thus, for each n > 0, i 2 I ,
ti 2 Ti and E  ‚  T i ,
Eı;k 1 \ .‚  T i /ı;k  Eı;k : (33)
The proof of (32) is by induction inm. Obviously, (32) holds form D 0. Now assume that it holds
for some m > 0 and fix i 2 I , ti 2 Ti and t 0i 2 T i with t 0i 2

B
.1 ";1 "/
i
mC1
.‚ T ı;k1  T ı;k2 /
and dki .ti ; t
0
i / < ı. Since 

i .‚  T i jti / D 1, in order to prove that dkCmC1i .ti ; t 0i / < ı C " it
suffices to show that i .EıC";kCmjt 0i / > i .Ejti /   ı   " for each E  ‚  T i . Indeed,
i
 
EıC";kCm
ˇˇ
t 0i
  i  Eı;k \ B.1 ";1 "/ i m ‚  T ı;k1  T ı;k2 ˇˇt 0i
 i
 
Eı;k 1 \ .‚  T i /ı;k \

B
.1 ";1 "/
 i
m 
‚  T ı;k1  T ı;k2
ˇˇ
t 0i

 i
 
Eı;k 1
ˇˇ
t 0i
   "  i  E ˇˇti   ı   ";
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis, the second from (33), the third
from t 0i 2

B
.1 ";1 "/
i
mC1
.T ı;k/ and the fourth from dki .ti ; t
0
i / < ı. 
A.9 Proofs of Theorems 4 and 5
The proofs of the theorems rely on the four lemmas below. Before presenting the results, we need
some preliminaries. First, in the proofs we use the following notation: for each ı > 0, i 2 I and
measurable E  ‚  T i , we let Eı;1 denote the uniform-weak ı-neighborhood of E, that is,
Eı;1 D T
k > 1
Eı;k :
Second, we say a finite type space T D .Ti /i2I has full support if i .Ejti / > 0 for every i 2 I ,
ti 2 Ti and E  ‚  T i . Third, generalizing our notations hdP and hd S , we define the metric
d UW on T  by letting d UW.t; t 0/ D maxi2I d UWi .ti ; t 0i / for every t D .ti /i2I and t 0 D .ti /i2I in
T , and given two type spaces T D .Ti /i2I and T 0 D .T 0i /i2I in T we write hdUW.T; T 0/ for the
Hausdorff distance between T and T 0 under d UW, that is,
hdUW.T; T
0/ D max

sup
t2T
inf
t 02T 0 d
UW.t; t 0/ ; sup
t 02T 0
inf
t2T d
UW.t; t 0/

:
Since for each i 2 I the uniform-weak topology on T i is finer than the product topology on T i ,
and hence product-closed sets in T i are also uniform-weakly closed, hdUW is also a metric on T .
Lemma 13. Let T D .Ti /i2I be a finite type space with full support. Let j 2 I and Ntj 2 Tj and
suppose there is a sequence of common prior types tnj such that d
UW
j .Ntj ; tnj /! 0. Then there is a
sequence of finite common prior type spaces T n such that hdUW.T; T n/! 0.
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Proof. Since T is a finite type space with full support, there exists  > 0 such that, for each i 2 I ,
both of the following hold:
d UWi .ti ; t
0
i / < 2 ) t 0i D ti 8ti ; t 0i 2 Ti ; (34)
 < i .Ejti / 8ti 2 Ti ; 8¿ ¤ E  ‚  T i : (35)
Fix ı 2 .0; / and choose n such that d UWj .Ntj ; tnj / < ı. Let n be a common prior with n.tnj / > 0.
Since n is a common prior, for each i 2 I we have
n
 ftigı;1 > 0 ) ˇˇˇn Eı;1ˇˇftigı;1   i  Ejtiˇˇˇ < ı 8ti 2 Ti ; 8E  ‚T i :49 (36)
Since n
 fNtj gı;1 > n.tnj / > 0, it follows from (35) and (36) that, for each i 2 I ,
n
 ftigı;1 > 0 and ˇˇˇn Eı;1ˇˇftigı;1   i  Ejtiˇˇˇ < ı 8ti 2 Ti ; 8E  ‚  T i : (37)
Let .T ni /i2I be the type space defined as follows. For each i 2 I , T ni D ff ni .ti / W ti 2 Tig, where
i
 
  f n i .t i /
ˇˇ
f ni .ti /
 D n   ftigı;1  ft igı;1
n
 
‚  ftigı;1  T ı;1 i
 8 2 ‚; 8ti 2 Ti ; 8t i 2 T i ;
which is well defined by (34). Clearly, .T ni /i2I is a common prior type space, with the common
prior Nn defined as follows:
Nn ; f n1 .t1/; f n2 .t2/ D n   ftigı;1  ft igı;1
n
 
‚  T ı;1i  T ı;1 i
 8.; t1; t2/ 2 ‚  T1  T2:
Moreover, for each i 2 I , ti 2 Ti and k > 1 we have dki .ti ; f ni .ti // < ı. To prove the claim for
k D 1, note that for each E  ‚ we have
i
 
E
ˇˇ
f ni .ti /
 D n E  ftigı;1  T ı;1 i 
n
 
‚  ftigı;1  T ı;1 i
 > n E  T ı;1 i ˇˇftigı;1 > i .Ejti /   ı;
where the second inequality follows from (37). Proceeding by induction, suppose the claim is true
for some k > 1. Then, for each E  ‚  T i ,
i
 
Eı;k
ˇˇ
f ni .ti /

> i
 ˚
.; f n i .t i // W .; t i / 2 E
	ˇˇ
f ni .ti /

D 
n
 
Eı;1  ftigı;1

n
 
‚  ftigı;1  T ı;1 i
 > n Eı;1ˇˇftigı;1 > i .Ejti /   ı;
where the first inequality follows from the induction hyothesis, and the third from (37). Thus,
d UWi .ti ; f
n
i .ti // < ı for each i 2 I and ti 2 Ti , and hence hdUW.T; T n/ < ı. 
49By definition of conditional probability, if  is a common prior, then, for each i 2 I and measurable E  T i with
.E/ > 0, we have .F jE/ D .1=.E// RE i .F jti /.dti / for each measurable F  ‚  T  i .
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Lemma 14. For each " > 0 and finite type space T there exists a finite non-common prior type
space with full support T 0 such that hdUW.T; T 0/ < ".
Proof. Fix " > 0 and a finite type space T D .Ti /i2I . In order to construct the type space T 0, let
ı 2  0; "
2

and consider first the type space T 00 D .T 00i /i2I defined as follows. For each i 2 I ,
T 00i D ffi .ti / W ti 2 Tig, where for each ti 2 Ti and E  ‚  T i ,
i
 ˚
.; f i .t i // W .; t i / 2 E
	ˇˇ
fi .ti /
 D .1   ı/ i .Ejti / C ıjEjj‚  T i j :
Clearly, T 00 has full support, and an immediate induction argument shows that d UWi .ti ; fi .ti // <
"
2
for each i 2 I and ti 2 Ti . Thus, hdUW.T; T 00/ < "2 . If T 00 is a non-common prior type space,
then setting T 0 D T 00 completes the proof. Otherwise, assume that T 00 admits a common prior  ,
fix .Nt1; Nt2/ 2 T 00 and two distinct  0;  00 2 ‚, let 0 < ı0 < mini2I;t 00
i
2T 00
i
;E‚T 00 i 

i .Ejti /, and
let T 0 D .T 0i /i2I be the type space defined as follows. For each i 2 I , T 0i D ff 0i .t 00i / W t 00i 2 T 00i g,
where
2. 0; f 01.Nt1/jf 02.Nt2// D 2. 0; Nt1jNt2/C ı0; 2. 00; f 01.Nt1/jf 02.Nt2// D 2. 00; Nt1jNt2/   ı0
and, for every i 2 I and .; t 00i ; t 00 i / 2 ‚  T 00i  T 00 i for which i .; f 0 i .t 00 i /jf 0i .t 00i // is not yet
defined,
i .; f 0 i .t 00 i /jf 0i .t 00i // D i .; t 00 i jt 00i /:
Clearly, T 0 has full support, and an immediate induction argument shows that hdUW.T 00; T 0/ < "2 .
Thus, hdUW.T; T 0/ 6 hdUW.T; T 00/C hdUW.T 00; T 0/ < ". Moreover, T 0 does not admit a common
prior, because
1. 0; f 02.Nt2/jf 01.Nt1//
1. 00; f 02.Nt2/jf 01.Nt1//
D 

1.
0; Nt2jNt1/
1. 00; Nt2jNt1/
D .
0; Nt1; Nt2/
. 00; Nt1; Nt2/
D 

2.
0; Nt1jNt2/
2. 00; Nt1jNt2/
<
2. 0; f 01.Nt1/jf 02.Nt2//
2. 00; f 01.Nt1/jf 02.Nt2//
;
where the second and third equality follow from the fact that  is a common prior for T 00. 
Lemma 15. For every finite non-common prior type space with full support T D .Ti /i2I there
exists " > 0 such that hdUW.T; T 0/ > " for every common prior type space T 0. Furthermore,
d UWi .ti ; t
0
i / > " for every i 2 I , ti 2 Ti and common prior type t 0i 2 T i .
Proof. The second claim is an immediate consequence of the first claim and the proof of Lemma 13.
To prove the first claim, first note that since T is finite, there exists  > 0 such that
d UWi .ti ; t
0
i / < 2 ) t 0i D ti 8ti ; t 0i 2 Ti : (38)
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Moreover, since T is finite and has no common prior, there exists f W ‚  T ! R such thatX
.;t 02/2‚T2
f .; t1; t
0
2/

1.; t
0
2jt1/ > 0
>
X
.;t 01/2‚T1
f .; t 01; t2/2.; t 01jt2/ 8.t1; t2/ 2 T: (39)
(See, for instance, Samet, 1998) Now suppose, contrary to our claim, that hdUW.T; T n/! 0 for a
sequence of common prior type spaces T n. Choose N so that hdUW.T; T n/ <  for each n > N ,
and for each such n define f n W ‚  T n ! R by letting
f n.; tn1 ; t
n
2 / D f .; t1; t2/ 8.t1; t2/ 2 T; 8.tn1 ; tn2 / 2 T n \ .ft1g;1/  ft2g;1/; (40)
which is well defined by (38) and by the fact that T ni  T ;1i for each i 2 I . Then, it follows
from (39) and (40) that, for each sufficiently large n,X
.;t 02/2‚T n2
f n.; tn1 ; t
0
2/

1.; t
0
2jtn1 / > 0
>
X
.;t 01/2‚T n1
f .; t 01; tn2 /2.; t 01jtn2 / 8.tn1 ; tn2 / 2 T n:
But, letting n denote the common prior for the type space T n, we then reach the contradiction
that
P
.;tn/2‚T n n.; tn/ is both positive and negative. 
Lemma 16. Let T D .Ti /i2I be a finite type space, and let T n D .T ni /i2I be a sequence of type
spaces in T . Then, hdP.T; T n/! 0 if and only if hdUW.T; T n/! 0.
Proof. Since uniform-weak convergence implies product convergence, it suffices to prove the
“only if” part. First note that, since .Ti /i2I is a finite type space, by Lemma 12 there exist  > 0
and k > 1 such that for every ı 2 .0; /, i 2 I and ti 2 Ti ,
ftigı;k \ C 1i
 
‚  T ı;k1  T ı;k2
  ftigı;1: (41)
Now fix any ı 2 .0; /. Since hdP.T; T n/! 0, there exists N > 1 such that
sup
ti2Ti
inf
tn
i
2T n
i
dki .ti ; t
n
i / < ı and sup
tn
i
2T n
i
inf
ti2Ti
dki .ti ; t
n
i / < ı 8i 2 I; 8n > N: (42)
Then, for each i 2 I and n > N , we have T ni  T ı;ki and hence, using the fact that T ni  C 1i .‚
T n1  T n2 /, also T ni  C 1i .‚  T ı;k1  T ı;k2 /. It follows from (41) that for each i 2 I , n > N ,
ti 2 Ti and tni 2 T ni , if dki .ti ; tni / < ı then d UWi .ti ; tni / < ı. Thus, by (42), hdUW.T; T n/ < ı. 
60
We can now prove Theorems 4 and 5. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006, Theorem 3) show
that finite types are dense under the strategic topology. Since the uniform weak topology is finer
than the strategic topology, it follows from Lemma 14 that the set of types that belong to some
finite non-common prior type space with full support are also dense under the strategic topology.
By Lemma 15 and Theorem 3, each such type belongs to a strategically open set that does not
contain any common prior type. Thus, Theorem 4 follows.
Mertens and Zamir (1985, Theorem 3.1) show that the set of finite type spaces is dense in
T under the product topology on type spaces. Since the uniform weak topology is finer than the
product topology, it follows from Lemma 14 that the set of finite non-common prior type spaces
with full support is also dense in T under the product topology on type spaces. By Lemma 15 and
Lemma 16, each finite non-common prior type space with full support also belongs to a subset of
T that is open under the product topology on type spaces and does not contain any common prior
type space. Thus, Theorem 5 follows.
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